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Since the Soviet anion entered Eastern Europe in 1944,
each twelve year period has been punctuated by a serious
challenge to their continued control and has been responded
to with a Soviet military intervention. The events in
Poland which erupted in August, 1980, provide the most
recent example. This study, which cannot be all-inclusive
because of information difficulties and the currency of the
situation, addresses:
1) what is currently happening in Poland;
2) how these events challenge the Soviet Onion;
3) how the Soviets have reacted to the events thus far; and
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I. INTRODUCTION
In October, 1956, Hungary's communist party revolted.
The Soviets intervened twice within the succeeding two
weeks, the latter intervention more widely reaembered for
its bloodiness and its success at quelling the revolt. In
January, 1968, Alexander Dubcek became the Czechoslovak
Communist Party First Secretary. 3y March, his reformist
trends were evident and in August, only five months later,
Soviet tanks rolled into Prague and brought an end to the
Prague spring. In Poland, a severe challenge to the
communist system became evident in August 1980. Yet the
Soviets have waited ten months to respond to the challenge
in a manner similar to those already related. Should
intervention be considered probable? Why has military
intervention been delayed? When might it finally occur? It
is to these questions that this study addresses itself.
Two sagas contribute to the answer. One is of the quest
of the Polish nation foe expressions of its independence.
The other is of the Soviet and Russian nature to expand and
maintain control of adjacent areas. While answers to the
questions cannot be definitively found without careful

consideraton of both stories, this analysis focuses on one,
the Soviet/Russian story. Sufficient elements of the other
are included as are necessary.
In pursuit, then, of answers to the questions presented,
this study first reviews and analyzes the new social and
political situation emerging in Poland. It attempts to
relate the events which cause the Soviets concern. It also
attempts to determine the extent and the depth of the roots
of the challenge which is arising in Poland.
Chapter II surveys the historical interaction of the
Poles and the Bussians. Only with this perspective can an
American hope to share with the current Soviet decision-
makers a similar Weltansh uaunq. world perspective. The
chapter uncovers the strong continuity of Soviet and Russian
attitudes and habits with regard to Poland. It also touches
on Polish cultural traits which may continue to cause
problems both to their success and to Soviet intervention.
Chapter III then returns to the present and reviews the
multitude and variety of stakes which are challenged or
affected by the events in Poland. Current Soviet stakes can
be classified into one of four groups. The first group are
those which threaten subsystem control structures, the
second are those which challenge the Soviet model of a
10

socialist state*s political organization, the third, those
challenges which directly threaten ths Soviet Union, and
finally, those competing challenges which are jeopardized by
the Polish events.
With the background of 1 the first three chapters, the
fourth analyzes the reaction of the Soviets since last
August. East European reactions are included for their
weight as both inputs into and outputs from the Soviet
decision-making apparatus. Specific attention is paid to
the early Deceiber and latter March • time periods when
military intervention appeared to be under serious
consideration.
Chapter 7 closes by integrating the first four chapters
and by using the insights derived from them to project into
the future. Alternatives to intervantion, and tha nature of
the intervention are addrsssed as well as the ability of the
OS and the West to affect the Soviet decision.
This study has benefited greatly from the counseling and
assistance of Professor Jiri Valenta, Coordinator, Soviet
and East European Studies, Department of National Security
Affairs, at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr Valenta
arranged my interview with Dr Dmitri Simes of Johns Hopkins
School for Advanced International Studies whose comments
11

rendered valuable insight into the nature of the Soviet
decision-makers and into their decision-making apparatus. Dr
Valenta also enabled me to review portions of my work with
Professor Andrzej Korbonski of the Rand Corporation, Dr
Robert Conquest, visiting professor at the Hoover
Institution, and John Campbell, Ssnior Fellow at the Council
of Foreign Relations. I was also greatly aided by my lengthy
discussions with a Polish party official who provided an
appreciation of both the Polish people and situation as well
as the attitudes of one of its party members. Finally, I
would like to thank Dr Robert Looney for his advice and
assistance which benefited my understanding of the
difficulties experienced in the Polish economic development.
His jovial banter during the long hours of work were also
not unimportant in maintaining the alertness requisite to a





It is impossible to discuss Soviet reactions in general,
or the likelihood of their intervention into Poland
specifically, without delving into Polish developments at
some length. These develapments have received widespread
coverage thoughout the year and warrant lengthy analysis on
their own merits. Such is not, however, the intent of this
author. This chapter seeks to paint a selective picture of
the details which either cause the Soviets concern or which
may affect their reactions. What has happened in Poland to
generate soviet concern? Why has this happened? How has the
situation evolved? Why is Poland different from
Czechoslovakia?
Today, we are continually assaulted by the news media
reports on the labor strife, political disorder, and the
economic shortages which are prevailing in Poland. Meat,
sugar, milk, and bread are all in short supply, with some
rationed. Poland has been called "the international New York
City,'* and in several cases, Western observers have become
concerned that massive SDviet intervention was actively
13

under consideration. However, the Polish problem has been
developing for a very long period of time. In 1957, Prof
Stanislaw Stomma was elected foe the first time to the
Polish S eim (Parliament). In 1960, he authored a manuscipt
which argued for even closer alliance of Poland and the
USSR. But in 1977, he failed to return to the Sejm after he
had been reelected. He has since written another book
entitled The Tragedies of Polish Reality, in which he argues
There are limits beyond which the realist may not go -
when their repeated efforts at compromise find no
response from the other side, there is no other way but
open resistance. 1
Professor Stomma is not alone in his feelings. Many Poles
were generally concerned that an explosion would occur
during the late seventies. Jacek Wejroch, an influential
member of the Catholic Intelligentsia Club (KIK) , has said
that "if solidarity had not arisen... we would have met with
a civil war." 2 Seen in this light, the August strikes and
the Gdansk agreements are but a small chapter in the recent
history of Poland. These strikes did however call the
Polish and the soviet leadership's attention to Poland. They
» Adam Bromke, "Czechoslovakia 1963-Poland 1979: A Dilemna
for Moscow," In ternational Journal 33 (Autumn 1978) :762.
2 Jacek Wejroch, "The Polish Situation from the Viewpoint of
the Catholic Intelligentsia," speach given in Polish dunna
January 1981. Translated by Craig Holley.
14

did this by flagging three Polish trends. The first was to
the deterioration of the Polish economy. The second was to
the deepening of popular attitudes against the present
regime and the organization of their expression of these
attitudes. The third was to the weakening of the Party, a
weakness that has grown seriously since the August accords.
Each of these trends requires deeper understanding because
of their central nature to the problem at hand.
B. ECONOMY
Poland has a population of 35 million of whom 19 million
are in the labor force. Seventy percent of these work in
industry and 26 percent work in private farming. 3
Notwithstanding the apparent prominence of the industrial
sector, Poland has the "only centrally planned economy which
relies on farming." 4 Polish GNP was the twelfth largest in
the world in 1978. In the late seventies, it was the second
largest exporter of coal in the world, following immediately
behind the United States. Historically, it has also been an
3 Secretariat, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,
Statistical Yearbook, 1978 (London: IPC Industrial Press,
LTo7~197Br7 p7~T57
William J. Newcomb, "Polish Agriculture: Policy.
Performance, and Prospects." la Poland, 1980: An East
European Countrv Study., a collection of papers""submTTte3~€o
tne Joint ~"Sconomic""Committ eex U.S. Congress (Washington,
D.C. : 1 September 1980), p. 97.
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exporter of food. Fifty-five percent of its trade is
conducted with East Europe and another 30% with the Soviet
Union. 3 Despite this seemingly healthy background, Poland
has major economic problems. Today, estimates of its foreign
hard currency debt range between $24 and $28 billion. It has
also recently become a major importer of agricultural
products. What actions contributed to this massive
reversal?
1 • His tor ical Summary.
Following the German retreat from Poland, and the
arrival of the Soviets in 1944, Poland embarked on a new
economic road guided by the needs of the Soviet Union.
Agricultural prices failed to satisfy the workers demands
for food and in 1956, bread riots expressed Polish
objections to the course in which the economy was
proceeding. The subsequent change in leadership brought
Wladislaw Gomulka into power. He halted collectivization of
agriculture in an attempt to increase food production. In
the latter 'SO's, economic development slowed throughout
Eastern Europe. After a decade of stagnation, many East
European countries sought to reform their economies in the




late ^O's. Poland, however, chose to wait until afzer
another set of "bread riots" had forced another leadership
change and made Sierek the new First Secretary in 1970.
Briefly surveying the decade of the seventies,
internal developments caused changes in policy towards:
agriculture and industry in 1970, agriculture in 1973,
agriculture and industry in 1976-1977, and are causing
changes to both sectors today. Additionally, external
developments were of major importance in 1974-1975 and also
contributed to the changes in 1976-1977. This hasty
overview prepares the reader to examine the policies of the
•70»s more closely.
Gierek's general objectives in 1970 were to raise
living standards and involve the working class in
management. specific Dbjectives of the '71-'75 Five Year
Plan (FTP) were to increase exports and satisfy home
markets.* He sought to do this by addressing both portions
of Poland 1 s economy -- industrial aad agricultural.
2- New Develogment Strateg
y
In 1970, Poland's economy was burdened by the lack
of competitiveness of its industry in foreign markets and by
its reliance on agriculture. In an attempt to overcome
* Ibid., pp. 997-998.
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these deficiencies, Giere^s "Hew Development Strategy"
(NDS) called foe importation of whole new factories from the
West. Massive borrowing from the West would finance their
purchase and construction. These loans would subsequently
be repaid from the additional income generated by exports
produced in these same factoriss. This strategy involves a
major gamble, but it is sound from an abstract point of
view. 7 In the years following its adoption, the Polish
economy witnessed dramatic growth rates.
However, these very high rates of growth only told
part of the story. The Polish planners failed to take into
account necessary infrastructure investments. These
extremely high rates of growth required an addition to the
labor force of at least 100,000 new workers. It also greatly
exceeded the capacity of construction and engineering
enterprises to process them. 8 The task was made more
difficult because, while the targeting of industries
emphasized mechanical engineering, electrical, and chemical
sectors, in reality, the targeting was a shotgun approach
which caused the rapid diversification to be poorly
7 See George R. Feiwel, "Consequences of Excessive
Investment Rates," £ivista int§rrja2ionale gi scienze
econom iche e commerciliT~23 (May=Juns T9/7J": 392-506.
9 Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the
Beginning of the 1980's." in Poland, 1980, p. 37.
18

planned.' Complications arose because "investment goods were
imported without ensuring an adequate supply of all
necessary complementary domestic inputs." 10 These high rates
of industrial growth were also incompatible with the
increases in national income.
Difficulties were not limited to the ramifications
of these high growth rates. Strategy problems also arose.
Key to the NDS was an assumption that an excess of exports
would result from the adapted measures. However, planners
lost control over the imports not only because of the
shotgun approach, but also because of the mechanism of
"special political linkages, favoritism, and personal
contacts." * *
Two other criticisms of this strategy can be seen at
a broader level of analysis. First, tieing in with the
foregoing discussion, much of the industry selected for
import was materially intensive, and hence, was import
intensive. This rendered it very susceptible to the
recession which occurred in the West in 1974. Second, these
industries, particularly the chemical sector, also tended to
9 Gary Teske, "Polish Balance of Payments." in Poland, 1980,
p. 87.
l ° ?allenbuchl, p. 38.
i» Ibid., p. 38.
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import the energy crises which developed in the West in
1973.
Finally, the NDS required greater flexibility in its
administration bat there was an absence of the bold reforms
necessary to allow this flexibility to be exercised. This
deficiency was at the heart of the failure. It underlay many
of the preceding criticisms, and it jeopardized the gamble
almost from the Dutset. However, the signs of trouble were
not identified and hence could not be addressed for some
time.
3« Directions in Farm Policy, 1970
Great attention was also given to agriculture at the
beginning of Gierek»s tenure. The push to socialize
farming, always present in the Eastern Bloc, has met with
its stiffest resistance in Poland. By 1970, mors than 80% of
the agricultural population still worked in private (non-
socialized) farms. 12 policy makers in Poland have routinely
experienced the "dilemna that measures to increase private
farm output also strengthen the farmer's hold on their land
and frustrate the government drive towards socialization.
"
l3
** Secretariat, CMEA, Stati stical Yearbook, 1979, p. 15.
13 William Newcomb, "Polish Agriculture: Policy,
Performance, and Prospects." in Poland, 1980, p. 98.
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Gierek answered the question of improving farm
output with a series of incentives which included lowering
land tax rates, modifying rate structures, abolishing a
system whereby coal purchases by farmers were linked to
their output (an attempt to link the agricultural sector to
the centrally planned economy) , and by giving legal title to
the land to the farmer who worked it.** These incentives
were successful and the agricultural sector grew
significantly in the 'll^-lS period.
4. Addressing F^rm Policy Successes, 1221
But success in these agricultural incentives was
apparent as early as 1973, and so the incentives were
allowed to deteriorate as planners shifted their sights back
towards the long-term goals of socializing agriculture.
This emphasis took on the form of acquiring into the
socialized sector new farm land from the private sector on a
voluntary basis. Farmer profits, which had also experienced
rapid growth during the early 70*3 began to reverse
themselves as imports rose in cost more quickly than the
value of their products.
The negative impact of planning which aimed at
socializing agriculture was multiplied by other factors.
l * Hewcoab, o. 104.
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First, previously related, were the falling profits of the
farmers. Another was the growth of national income which
manifested itself in part in higher meat consumption. This
growing domestic demand and waning supply combined to
created a necessity for a major cutback in the Polish
export of meat in 1974. These falling meat exports were
followed in 1975 by negative growth in agricultural
investment and in 1976, by a reduction in general
agricultural output.
The declining health of agriculture following new
policies of 1973 and the faltering gamble of the attempts at
re-industrialization resulting from bad management, poor
strategy, Western inflation and the oil crisis were all
prerequisites for the events of 1976.
5. Res ponding to Agricultural Difficulties
Declining meat production lead to an attempt to
increase meat prices in the summer of 1976. These price
increases generated great civil disturbances. "Unable, or
unwilling to adjust prices and wages," 13 the government
chose to ease the resulting tension by importing beef.
These events lead to readoption by the government of the
generally pragmatic measures of the early *70's. Government
is ibid., p. 97
22

intent was to increase food supplies and to encourage farm
upkeep while continuing to tie farmers more closely to the
state plan. 16 One specific policy eased credit available in
an effort to help farmers buy land from the state. The
reversal of the trend of adding land to the socialized farm
sector was caused by two factors. During the preceding
years, land had entered the socialized sector so quickly
that it exceeded the absorption capacity of that sector.
Much of the land was poor and because of its small size,
generally 2-5 hectares, it was not suitable to the
application of economies of scale necessary to become
productive. Another specific policy promoted construction
investments which had fallen after 1975.
But the situation of 1976-1977 differed from that of
1970 in two ways. On thisr later occasion, expansion of the
food available to the consumers preceded the expansion of
the supply by the producers and was brought about only by
importing the difference. Imports were also increased by
the requirement for feed for the domestically produced meat
because expansion of these feed supplies had not been
emphasized. Both these necessities called into question the





difference of the 1976/1977 period arose because
expectations had changed concerning the benefits of
expanding production. 17 Frequent reversals in government
farm policy caused the farmer to remain distrustful. Hence,
their reaction to the new incentives was much less
spectacular than it had been in 1970. While production
increased, the keys to this period are that the once strong
agricultural sector evidenced weakness and now accounted for
3055 of all imports from the industrialized West.
6. Modified Economic and F_in.ajn.cial System
Problems were not only limited to agriculture. As
related, the NDS led to large imports. The factories being
imported were not coming on line in tima, and the
infrastructure and political-economic organization of the
country could not meet the demands of this strategy.
Therefore, in December, 1976, the industrial development
policy was overhauled with adoption of the Modified Economic
and Financial system (MEFS) . This new policy sought to
rationalize imports while expanding exports to balance the
foreign trade. But the new policy also marked a return to
orthodoxy by limiting the initiative of managers. It






manipulated against one another and failed to reflect
significant improvement. 13 However, most significant at the
basic level of analysis was its effect on the imports and
exports. Imports were arbitrarily restricted, and
consequently, new industry, which was import oriented, was
choked. Emphasis on exports subsequently reached a level
where production of final products was maximized at the
expense of the necessary inputs to these same final
products, compounding the "choking" problem. The attempt to
increase exports and limit imports was ill-planned in the
industrial sector and unsupported by the agricultural
policy. Compounding all of these problems was the steadily
increasing national income which taxed the system with
domestic demand.
The Polish government has attributed the poor
performance experienced during the period 1977-1979 to four
factors. 19 The first two reasons relate to the lack of
improvements in Poland's economic infrastructure and are
very much present today. They are the energy crisis and
transport difficulties. The energy crisis refers to Poland's
requirements for power generation which now outstrips its
13 Fallenbuchl, p. 51.
19 Communique from the Central Statistics Office, Warsaw,
published in Tribuna Ludu, No. 3U, 1980, pp. 4-5.
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production capacity. Daring 1980, brownouts and blackouts
of industry and private dwellings have become frequent. 2 °
The transportation difficulties are most evident by their de
facto limitation of greater Polish coal exports which must
be transported from the mines in the south to the Baltic
ports in the north, A third difficulty pertains to lack of
sufficient supply of materials which has been previously
discussed. The final difficulty identified by the
government has been a succession of severe winters.
But serious criticism must focus on bad management.
Decisions identified as reflecting bad management include
pushing development plans during the Western recession;
income, pricing, and agricultural policies; the shotgun
development approach; and inattention to infrastructure
requirements. 21 Writing under the pen name of PDwolny, one
Pole has captured the essence of the problem — "those who
must govern do not know how to govern.'* 22 From this
background arise the difficulties Poland is experiencing
today.
20 interview with an official of the Polish Communist Party,
Monterey, California, 11 December, 1980.




Pola nd. 1.9.80, p. 28
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7. Curren t Economic State
The close of the *70 *s has seen the economy in
shambles. In 1979, only 60% of the project completion
targets were met. Poland's economic planners are currently
living a "hand to mouth" existence according to one Western
analyst in Warsaw, investment in industry has been trimmed
by 52.5 billion in an effort to curtail the most capital
intensive projects which have long lead times. 23 The success
of this attempt represents only a small recovery of a
greater loss. The author was told that over $8 billion of
industrial material was lying unused in Poland due to lack
of planning for the necessary ancillary requirements. Some
of these are as profound as the factory building in which to
put the factory. 2* Even, at the Katowica foundry, a recently
completed project in which the Soviets have great interest,
large quantities of equipment valued at $800 million have
been stored in less than ideal circumstances.
The plight of the farmer is not much better.
Tractor parts are in extremely short supply. In 1980, only
8,000 of 22,000 required crankshafts were available. Normal
maintenance items were also in short supply. Only one-
23 Christian Science Monitor, 16 October 1980,
2 * Interview, 11 December 1980.
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quarter of the necessary oil filters, less than half the
batteries, and one-third of the tires needed were
available. 25 Farm production in 1980 was the worst in 20
years. Potato and sugar beet harvests showed 46.8% and 26. 7%
reductions, respectively. 2 * A succession of seasons with
adverse weather has had its effects, but most of the
problems of agriculture arise from the lack of machinery,
imported fertilizer, and an abundance of bad planning.
The August strikes have perhaps spurred the country
on to new programs with better chances for success, but the
August strikes have not been without their costs. East
German radio is quick to point out that since the strikes,
these costs have included total power cuts on 98 days and
partial cuts on another 25 days. 27 Iron and steel production
have also been significantly reducad. The Polish press has
called coal production, which now stands at only two-thirds
of normal, a "fullscale collapse of deliveries." 28
The strikes have had a positive effect in forcing
the government to change. In January, a new economic reform
25 Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1981.
26 Radio Free Europe Research. Situation. Report, Poland 3^81.
(Munich: Radio Free Europe, 18-T7 February 19^1), p. Z.
27 APN (East Berlin), 9 December 1980, in FBIS^EEtJ, 10
December 1980, p. E-2.
28 Warsaw Domestic Service, 3 February 1981, in F3IS-EEP, 4
February 1981, p. G-15.
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aimed at industry was drafted by the government. This reform
called for the introduction of self-government into every
factory, decentralization of decision making, with the
decisions based on profitability, and finally, it demands a
sharp reduction in western imports. Agricultural reform has
also been addressed. The government reform seeks to
increase funds for agriculture and provides provisions to
allow farmers to buy unused state farm land. These changes
have only come about as a direct result of the widespread
mobilization of the Polish population.
C. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN POLAND
The economic problems are only one facet of the Polish
experiment flagged by the \ ugust strikes. Economic demands
may be the earliest ones expressed because these demands are
safer to dispute inside a communist system. Existing
political undercurrents only begin to be openly acknowledged
after momentum has been gained. 29 It is to the political
undercurrents, the mobilization of the masses in
institutions lieing outside ths communist party, that we now
direct our attention.
29 j. a. Hontias, "Economic Conditions and Political
Instability in Communist Countries: Observations on
Strikes, Riots, and Other Disturbances," Studies in




Roots for the political mobilization of Poland have
long been present in the form of the Catholic Church. In
the words of one Polish communist party official, "the
Church has for a thousand years been aligned with the
people. It is part of the people, part of Poland's history.
It cannot be crushed under foot."3o Its role as a separate
political force within Poland has grown since the communists
came to power, although its political role is carefully
muted. Its contribution to the current situation, which has
been the subject of much dispute, can be largely cleared up
if the significance of the Church is analyzed from two
perspectives. The first is from the perspective of the role
of its leadership and the second is through the profound
impact it has as a separate organization which provides a
counter ideology and has a following of 30 million adherents
in a state of 35 million people.
During much of Poland's post war history, the Church
leadership has largely acted in alliance with the state.
After winning sufficient reforms to maintain its own
existence, it has chosen to remain a predominantly passive
*o "Hitherto in Poland »e Have Suffered Not from Socialism
But from Too Little socialism," L 1 Onita (Milan), 10
September 1980, in FBIS-2SU, 16 Sapt 1§sU, p. G-16.
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actor. This is not a surprising pattern of activity for the
institution responsible for the preservation of the Polish
nationhood throughout 200 years of Russian and Soviet
occupation. It is the behaviour one would expect of a
survivor who views his existence and impact in the long-term
to be more important that his impact on the short-term
problems.
Since last summer, the Church, working in various
manners, has broken this general policy and intervened in
short-term events four times. The first was in August when
it called for a return to work; the second was in early
November, when difficulties over Solidarity's registration
occurred; the third was in early December, during the period
of tension, nationwide strikes, and widespread concern for
the strong possibility of Soviet intervention; and the
fourth was at the end of the Bielska-Biala strikes in early
February. However, public doubt of ths leadership has been
raised by the consistent calls for moderation. The
leadership has responded to the government request on three
occasions while only once being responsive to the request of
a non-government representative. 31
31 Lech Walesa asksd for the Primate to support the peasants
on February 6 193 1. This support was given speedily and was
important in bringing about a solution to the 3ielskc-Biala
strikes that same day.
31

Notwithstanding the attitudes of the populace, the
party has the perception that the Church leadership
excercises great power and it has, therefore, attempted to
harness this power. In one instance in September, Church
appeals were given major air time in the government
controlled media. But there is clear evidence of the
questionable nature of this power. The appeals of Stefan
Cardinal Wyszynski which were used were aimed at women
because the men were no longer listening. 32 The death of the
Primate in May, 1981, can only serve to further weaken the
Church leaderships influence over short-terra events which
is already more valued than valuable because of the popular
perception that it has acted in alliance with the
government.
If the impact of the Church leadership has been
somewhat limited, the impact of the existence of the Church
has been much more profound. It has been noted that the
Church provides an idiom, a language, for the expression of
a challenge to the socialist system. The political essence
of the Church has been aptly described by a communist
political scientist as being a "perpetually competitive
32 "Still worries for the Future," Dagens Nyeter




ideological force juxtaposed between the party and the
state. "33
The Church* s importance in this devoutly Catholic
nation has increased in the last several years, especially
since the elevation of Karol Wojtyla to the Papacy. His
rise sparked renewed interest within the country and
increased the average Pole's national pride. Even
Solidarity's leader, Lach Walesa has remarked that the
Pope's visit to Poland in June 1979 played a role in the
preparation of Poland for the current events. 34 One form of
this preparation came through the use of a new organization
for crowd control during his visit. This was a Catholic
militia, separate from the government and the party,
numbering 40,000 monitors. 35 its success was demonstrated by
the absence of a single reported breach of order and its
value was derived from the organizational experience which
it gained. 36
33 jan B. de Wevdenthal, Poland: Communism Adrift- The
Washington Papers ", No. 72 (Beverly HilTs: Sage Publications,
Inc. , 1979) , p. 65.
>• "Lech Walesa: I* m a Worker, for Heaven's Sake!", Le Monde
(Paris) , 1U-15 September 1980, p. 3, in PBIS^JEU, "75
September 1980, p. G-22.
35 Christian Science Monitor, 10 Mach 1981.
36 Interview, 11 December 1980.
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Thus, the Church has provided one of the main keys
to the the population's ability to face up to, deal with,
and express their sentiments about the problems within their
society. While its day to day control over events is
probably limited, its importance comes through its
existence, the idiom it provides, and the pride it has
encouraged.
2. Solidarity
Two other actors are much newer and mors profound in
their short-term impact. The first is the Solidarity trade
union. It is ironic to reflect that 2ast Europe's first
communist politicians arose not within the communist party
where they may have been expected, but from the working
class so highly touted by Marx (bat later discredited by
Lenin). Jozef Pinkowski, a former Polish Prime Minister, has
written that the Solidarity trade union movement was "born
of the will and the hope of the working class." 37 Today it
encompasses approximately ten million people, including one-
third of the Polish United workers Party (PUWP, the official
name of the Polish Communist Party) . Solidarity started
publishing Jednosc in December with a circulation of one
37 Warsaw Domestic Service, 2U November 1980, in F3IS- 5SU,
26 November 1980, p. G-14.
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hundred thousand, and in February, it received permission to
expand publication of this weekly six-fold and to open eight
regional papers. The legislated right to exist, married
with the approval of these publications, reflects a
revolutionary change because this potential power has been
delegated to another part of the society not directly
controlled by the communist party.
The impact of this organization would not be so
profound without its unique leader, Lech Walesa. He is a
politically savvy ex-electrician who gained earlier
experience during the disturbances of June 1970. He is also
a moderate. There is some evidence that he was prepared to
accept a resolution to the August strikes on the sixteenth,
two weeks before the final resolution, and with only minor
gains won. 38 Walesa's contribution to Solidarity is his
ability to mold a union consensus which first springs from a
large unruly group which holds widely diverging ideas and
which, second, diverges from the established political norm
significantly, but thus far not tragically. "Everyone knows
38 Stud ium New.s abstracts, No. 4, October 1980. This report
may also have 5een~a government disinformation exercise.
Other evidence of his moderate position comes from interview
such as one broadcast on the Warsaw International Sevice, 18
November 1980, in FBIS-EEO, 20 November 1980, d. G-3.
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that he is essential for the movement's homogeneity. 39 It is
unclear whether one final anecdote is true or not. A member
of the Polish Catholic intelligentsia, while travelling in
the United States recently, related that two of Walesa 1 s
children are orphans of workers killed during the 1970
riots. 40 True or not, this story serves to highlight the
popular support Walesa enjoys.
Solidarity has ssveral difficulties. GrDwing from a
foundation which was laid in the years preceding the
strikes, Solidarity has a very weak central srganization.
Irs National Consultative Commission has at times evidenced
very little control over the members of the union. Because
of this loose organization, it is also highly susceptible to
the influences of internal politics. some of the most
serious strikes, occurring in January over work-free
Saturdays, were called by Walesa* s subordinate, Zbigniew
Bujak, while Walesa was in Italy visiting the Pope. It was
known that Bujak was dissappointed at not being included in
Walesa's entourage to see the Pope. 41 Solidarity's final
problem today stems from its quick growth. This has limited
* 9 "Warsaw Threatened a State of Siege," De
Volkskrant (Amsterdam) , 7 April 1981, p. 4, in FBIS^EEU, T3
iprfT^tfr; p. s-2i.
o speech, January 1981.
41 MM York Times, 17 January 1981.
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its control over its own grass roots. Mass psychology was
very evident in February when it almost overcame the strict
discipline which has marked the movement from its birth and
which has contributed so directly to its successes thus far.
Why has Solidarity, a loosely organized and
controlled organization succeeded? General agreement on an
explanation exists. It includes nationalism, the existence
of the Polish Church, the illegal cells of dissidents, the
underground press, and one specific dissident group, the
KOH. Attention is now turned to these last three elements.
3 . Disside nts
Much of Solidarity^ success is firmly based on the
emergence, in Poland, of a variety of dissident groups
following the disturbances of June, 1976. The seeds for
this emergence had been sown during the "March Events" of
1968 when the intellectuals and students clashed with the
government over a question of censorship. In reality, this
clash was over the government tendency to act in a haphazard
and authoritarian manner in areas which were beginning to be
popularly felt to lie outside thier jurisdiction. Three days
of rioting and three weeks of sit-ins on Polish universities
in that month were complimented by the young Prague Spring
blossoming to the south. But both the March 1963 and summer
37

1970 riots over meat price increases failed to see a
coalition between the workers and the intellectuals which
was strong enough to stand long in defiance of the system.
The Polish dissident movement has been distinguished
by three qualities. The first is autonomy; they are totally
separate from the party. The second is openness; the
earliest group declared its formation in an open letter to
the Sejm. Their third quality was their maintenance of
international ties in Eastern and Western Europe as well as
in the Soviet Onion itself. 42 Although the many groups which
arose since 1976 share this general qualities, they are not
all aliJce. One group, the Movement for Defense of Human and
Civil Bights (SOPCiO) largely adopted the "political
traditions of the interwar period."* 3 The Confederation of
Independent Poland (KPN), lead by Leszek Moczulski, was a
firebrand organization whose goal was a radical
reorientation of Poland within the international system,
following its complete break with the Soviet Union.
As has been implied, the first and most important
dissident group is KOR, the Committee for the Defense of
Workers. It was formed in September, 1976 and renamed the
42 Poland: Communism Idrift, pp. 53-61.
43 Adam 3romke, "The Opposition in Poland," Probl ems in
Communism, september-Octooer 1978, p. 42.
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Committee of Social Self Defense (KSS) one year later. It
used its limited funds to press human rights charges on the
government when they detained workers. Its leader is Jacek
Kuron, who is today one of the most vilified Poles in the
Soviet and East European press. In Western ayes, Kuron
appears to be moderate. He has been quoted as saying that
he is "unambiguously on the side of compromise."** But, to
the Soviets, he is mora radical. His vision for Poland's
future international position is of another Finland.
After 1976, he took on the task of organizing future
events so that they could lead to success rather than
failures as had been witnessed in 1956, 1970, and 1976.
Paraphrazing Lenin's famous question, what is to be done,
Kuron asked, what should we do. His answer was to call for
the organization of a multitude of movements which would be
individually incapable of success but which would, have
sufficient unity between them to render their collective
demands indisputable. He specifically envisioned movements
of the Church, the workers, the peasants, and the writers,
artists, and scholars.
*
s It is this loose organization that
is manifested in Solidarity's loose central organizing
44 |gg Statesman (London), 3 December 1980.
5 Jacek Kuron, "Reflections on a Program of Action," The
Polish Review 22 (No. 3 1977): 63.
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committee. This collective orientation was clearly
evidenced when, after Solidarity's registration, it lent its
assistance to the farmers in their guest to gala their own
union - Sural Solidarity.
Prom the tactical perspective, Kuron argued that the
first reguirement must be to break the state monopoly on
communication. In pursuit of this goal, by 1979, there were
twenty to thirty underground periodicals printing a wide
variety of material, including political treatises and
literary works. One clandestine publishing house was named
Nova. In three years, it published 115 books while using
five tons of paper each month! An operation of this
magnitude could not succeed without tremendous organization,
influence, and the tolerance of the Geirek regime. Shedding
further light on these last observations is the
acknowledgement that the President of the Polish Academy of
Sciences was one of fifty reviewers of a recent book.**
Another interesting elsmsnt in ths dissident
movement which arose was the organization of the Flying
University. This organization took its name from a similar
organization which existed prior to 1914 luring another
• "The Silent Printing Presses," L« Express (Paris). 10
January 1981, p. 49-50, in FBIS-EEg, IS January 1931, Annex.
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period of Russian subjugation. By the spring of 1978 it had
acquired a semi-institutionalized form and taken the name of
the Association of Educational Courses (TKN) . The aniversity
specialized in teaching courses that the communist system
could not allow because of content or slant, such as Polish
history.
The dissidents played a major role in the July and
August strikes. The most important periodical published by
the dissidents was the KOR publication Rabotnik. (The
Worker) . It attempted to forge ties with the workers and it
was apparently very successful. At the time of the strikes,
Rabotnik was in circulation of 27,000 to 35,000 copies and
each copy was read by many people. It was used to list other
strikes occurring throughout Poland and to give advice on
how to conduct a successful strike. Kuron's home was used
as a clearing house for strike information. In recognition
of KOR's influence one Politburo member dubbed the factory
strike committees "KOR-tiaf ia.'1 Robotnik*s effectiveness was
also witnessed by the increased success of the strikes in
locations where it had the greatest circulation. KOR*s
success in breaking the government monopoly on communication




However, since the conclusion of the strikes, the
role of the dissidents has been much more muted. Today they
serve in reduced numbers as behind the scenes advisors and
strategists for Solidarity, and their guidance must be




Brief mention should be made of yet another group.
In the middle of February, the Polish government made
concessions to the students. These concessions provided for
the end of compilsory courses in Marxism and the Russian
language. The absence of these compulsory courses is a
serious change because it strikes a major element of the
Soviets 1 attempt to inculcate their system in Poland and is
magnified because of the role these students will later play
in the Polish society. The students also won the legal right
to form a union in these February agreements.
5. Farmers
Farmers habitually face greater difficulties in
organizing themselves than do thsir industrial compatriots.
Thus it is not surprising to find that their efforts to
register an agricultural union have been slower. While they
can trace their origins to a meeting in September 1978 in
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the village of Lisow,** their renewed attempts did not begin
until October or become serious until after the new year.
Their tactics were generally similar to those used by
Solidarity earlier in the year. When initial attempts to
register were turned down by court ruling, which must
certainly have reflected Party disapproval, the farmers
resorted to protest actions. Within agriculture, these are
more dangerous than those in industry because of the short
•windows 1 for planting and the long lead times required to
restore slaughtered livestock holdings.* 8 As serious as the
protest actions could be, the government hesitated to allow
formation of this union. One explanation, which probably
reflects more deep-seated fear than a rational assessment,
notes that the Church is the strongest force among the
peasantry, while the Party is weakest among them. Perhaps
in recognition of this fear, and in a notable break with
Solidarity, the proposed charter of the Sural Solidarity
took occasion to unequivocally recognize the POWP as the
country's leading force.
Despite the Party 1 s reservations, and in light of
the dire need of the country to improve its agriculture and
47 Christian Science Monitor, 3 April 1981.
a Evidence that the protest was taking this form was given
on P3S, flacNeil-Lehrer Report, 13 February 1981.
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avoid compounding the already serious economic conditions,
Rural Solidarity was recognized on 16 April of this year.
While it only claims to represent one-third of the farmers
of the country,* • it represents unionization of the last
major element of the Polish society in a non-Communist
organ. Students, laborers, professionals, and farmers have
all forced major reforms in their respective areas.
D. THE POLISH UNITED WORKER'S PARTY (POWP)
While the dissidents provided the key to the
organization which proved so succsssful during the August
strikes, the PDW? has given evidence of all that is bad in
Poland today. It has few politicians and few leaders. Not
only is its organization weak, but even its legitimacy has
been directly questioned. Kuron has written that it has no
legitimacy, that its a p pa rat "is disgusted at the
leadership" which is "afraid of the masses and incapable of
making decisions.
"
s o This is perhaps the most succinct
evaluation that has been made of the PUWP as it existed
prior to the new year.
* 9 Christian science Monitor. 3 April 1981.
so
'»prg Paper Publishes Article by Polish Dissident." Die





The PUWP got itself into its present predicament by
refusing to reform during the seventies when reform was
necessary. Evidence of this was given during the previous
discussion of the economy. One analyst characterized its
aims during the decade of the • 70*s when he observed that it
sought to "preserve and strengthen the traditional
heirarchical principles of power and control on which the
system rested." 51
From an analytical viewpoint, its present predicament is
evidenced by three features which cause alarm. The first is
the loss of initiative at the top. It has been shocked by
the events which have transpired and has been unable,
through April, to regain the initiative. This loss is also
the result of a leadership divided by sharp differences, and
will be addressed below. The second is obstruction of
middle echelon members of the party (regional party
secretaries and officials on city committees) who have been
targeted for their incompetence by the attacks of the
population. Since the August strikes, thirty regional party
secretaries, over one-half of all those in Poland, and 80S
of the officials on city committees have been replaced. S2
51 Poland: Communism Adrift, p. 14.
52 lall Street Journal, 28 May 1981
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The third feature is the push by a clear majority of the
rank and file for the reform which the middle echelon
resists and over which the leadership is divided. S3 In the
middle of February, party members were reported to be coming
to the conclusion that the reform process was illusory.
Party dissarray was noted in
repeated and widespread attempts by both local party
officials and segments of its rank and file to develop
views and undertake actions contrary to the instructions
of the central leadership. 5 *
Its weakness was also evidenced in its continual and routine
losses to Solidarity, by its appointment of Gen Wojciech
Jaruzelski to the post of Premier in the middle of February,
and by its appointment of the first Catholic, Jerzy
Ozdowski, to the Sejm in November. These difficulties have
lead the party to a new and dangerous fracturing and loss of
control. A mid-April decision taken by the Wroclaw party
organization was unprecedented. It decided to elect its
delegates to the upcoming Party Congress by secret ballot.
This decision has since been adopted by other regional
organizations.
53 Christian s cie nce Monitor has reported this majority to
be 881 oFtte rank In<rfTIe. 20 April 1981.
54 Jan B. de Weydenthal. Radio Free Europe Research.




The move to secret ballot (free) election of Party
Congress delegates is only the first radical departure from
the orthodox Soviet political model. Another change strikes
at the heart of Leninist dogma. Democratic centralism,
verticle communication from higher to lower, has been
challenged with new horizontal linkages as reformist trends
in one region spread thoughout the country without the
approval or guidance of the senior party leadership and as
party groups of various orders in the hierarchical chain
intermingle with each other. This gives clear evidence of
the severity of the situation in the party today.
The POWP has been characterized as having both moderates
and hardliners. While this is an over simplification which
fails to highlight the nuances of the present situation, it
does render its essence. Senerally the hardliners are for a
centralized economic plan, tougher measures towards the
opposition, and a rather conservative ideology on party
affairs and internal security. The moderates favor economic
decentralization and expansion of ths cultural and religious
freedoms and more consultation with the workers. The
hardliners and moderates have been contesting control of the
Politburo since August. The moderates have the support of
the population while the hardliners have that of Moscow.
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Since August, positions of the principle actors have
cleared. Today, the hardliners, who lean somewhat left of
center, are Stefan Olszowski and Tadeusz Grabski while the
moderates, leaning slightly to the right of center are
Tadeusz Fiszbach and Kaziiierz Barcikowski. Stanislaw Kania
and Wojceich Jaruzelski sit in the center. Thus far, a
standoff has resulted. But the balance should not be
expected to continue after the meeting of the Party
Congress, scheduled for 14-18 July, 1981, when reforms will
undoubtedly be ratified and in which many, if not all, of
these people could fail to win reelection. Until that time,
it appears that the party will continue to be driven by
dissension from rank and file wishing reform, stymied by the
middle echelons seeking to preserve their jobs, and capped
by a divided leadership.
Jaruzelski holds out the hopa for some improvement in
the future viability of the government. Of him, Walesa has
said, "I had never before seen a member of the Government
make decisions. We have never had a Premier who justified so
much hope." 55 He has restored the post of Premier to a
position of power not previously seen. This is because of
55 "Walesa: I Want to Leave Solidarity." France-Soir (Paris) ,
8 April 1981, pp. 1,4, in lBlS z EEU f 9 Apnl^937, p. G-15.
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his unique combination of his positions as Premiar, Defense
Minister, and Politburo member. He is on a first name basis
with senior Soviet military officers and is considered a
patriot who would not welcome outside intervention. He is
also extremely hesitant to use force. He rose through the
ranks of the military by remaining uninvolved in the
factional politics which regularly removed his superiors.
In the quest for illuminating analogies one French writer
has called Jaruzelski "the Polish Alexander Haig. ,,S6
Committed to reform and a political solution to the crisis,
JaruzelsJci is indeed important to the unfolding crisis.
While factional disputes within the party are deep and
dangerous, it has so far successfully avoided allowing
Soviet intervention. It is possible that this has been
accomplished by being firm in the face of the Soviets during
their numerous conversations. Evidence that this firmness
is present within the leadership, certainly Stanislaw Kania,
the POWP First Secretary, is givan by the Belgian Minister
of Foreign Affairs who, after a visit to Poland on December
6, related that he was "impressed with the insistence with
5 * Although unspecified, this analogy is most applicable if
it is mada of Haig during the Watargare period.
H9

which the Polish leaders affirmed that they have the will
and capacity to solve the problems by themselves. "57
Each of the major daily actors has now been addressed.
However, discussion of those elements of the Polish
situation which give rise to Soviet concern or figure in the
calculations of alternatives is incomplete without attending
to the role of the Polish military.
E. POLISH MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES
Two organizations in Poland are equiped and organized
for fighting. The first, the militia, is composed of tough
well-trained security forces. The second, the military, is
made up of conscripts. The Polish army is today the largest
and in many respects the most modern of the Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) armies. It has five tank divisions and
eight motorized rifle divisions. It is unique among the
NSflP armies in that it also has one airborne and one
amphibious division. In 1972, 81X of the army*s officers
came from worker and peasant families.
s* "Foreign Minister Comments on polish Situation," Brussels




"The Polish military has today partially revived its
traditional ethos as the guardian of the Polish nation." 58
One reflection of this is the combined celebration on 29
November, of the anniversary of the 1830 revolt against the
Russians and Polish Officer's Cadets Day. 59
The military can theoretically perform two direct roles
in crises situations. One is in maintaining or restoring
domestic order and the other is in countering external
threats. The role of the military in maintaining or
restoring domestic order, through the active use of troops,
must be regarded as unlikely. The Army disobeyed orders to
fire during the 1956 Poznan riots and was used only in a
limited fashion to break up strikes in 1970. Jaruzelski has
claimed that this latter action was only conducted after
"uncoordinated orders" were issued. 6 <> Furthermore, their use
in 1970 compounded serious soul-searching within the armed
forces which arose after their participation in the Czech
invasion in 1968. Even the Soviets commented on their
invasion attitudes which they criticized as being marked by
58 A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev,
East European Military Es tab lishments: The Warsaw Pact
N"orfhern~?ierT R"=2tfT7/1 r A*F7FF7 73a nTa Monica T Tn"e Bana"
Corporation, December 1980) , p. v.
59 Warsaw Domestic Service, 29 November 1980, in F3IS-ES0, 5
December 1980, p. 3-30.
*° last European Milita ry E sta blishments, p. 6 0.
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"passivity" and "lack of committment" to the goals of the
invasion.* 1 This was even more striking because it disputed
the traditional animosities which exist between the Poles
and the Czechs. The nature of the resolution of this debate
was signalled in 1976, when it is widely believed that
Jaruzelski cautioned that "Polish soldiers will not fire on
Polish workers." 62 The likelihood that the security forces
would be used for internal control is higher by their nature
and history, but lower in reality. rhey number only 77,000
and their regular units were unable to handle riots in 1956
or 1970. Furthermore, their demorilization today is of such
serious dimensions that questions of their effectiveness
must be raised. It is therefore unlikely that they will be
able to play a major role in the current crisis either.
Turning to the role of both the military and the
security forces in responding to an external threat, one
finds a different picture. As would be expected, both have
been generally neutralized by the presence of Soviet
officers and advisors. However, on occasion, elements of the
Army and security forces have been succeeded in acting with
** Ibid.
, p. 60.
62 Dale Herspring, "The Polish Military and the Policy
Establishments, p . 61.
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independence. In October 1956, when one Soviet division
stationed in Poland began moving towards Warsaw, elements of
the Polish security forces were moved into positions around
Warsaw to block Soviet access, *3 clearly threatening armed
resistance.
During the current crisis, it has been reported that
Polish military units took up positions naar one Soviet
division at Wroclaw in a move reminiscent to that of the
security forces in 1956.* They participated in the
Br other hood- in- Arms exercise in September 1980 only in
reduced numbers and when the Soviet amphibious units were
employed, the Polish ones were not exercised at all. This
lends interesting evidence to the sensitivity of the Soviets
to the role of the Polish armed forces in a possible future
intervention. Ose of the security forces in October, 1956
was a result of the commanders 1 allegiance to the Polish
government and their ability to thwart the Soviet advisors.
One should not, therefore, discount their potential for
future use in this role either.
The current orientation of the military commanders has
been made clear in a variety of ways. In one statement, the
43 2ast European Military. E stablishments, p. 23
64 H£M.§.ie§JS r 29 September 1980, p. 36.
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military leaders noted that they favored "the bilateral and
unequivocal implementation" of the August agreements. 63 In a
statement that was yet stronger, 50 generals and 200 staff
officers said that "Poland's military chiefs are secretly
pledged to fight with their people against any invading
communist army." 66 The great extent of the integration of
the military leadership with that of the P0"WP has also been
reported. 67 Thus, with their recent emphasis in the
officer's corps on professional military criteria over
political preparation, and the general de-Sovietization that
has occurred siace Gomulka's rise in 1956, their role in
countering a future intervention into Poland must not be
discounted.
F. REVIEW
This chapter has demonstrated the great economic
instability in the country and the economic calamity facing
that nation, the unity, organization and vocal nature of the
opposition which has emerged in Poland, and the weakness of
the adherents to that systsem, the PUWP. One last comment
6 * Warsaw Domestic Television, 29 November 1980, in FBIS-
SEP. 29 November 1980, p. 3-11.
66 2&iiy_ Express (London) , 3 December 1980.
67
"If the USSR intervened in Poland, its Intervention Would
Be "Lawful 1 ," Le soir (Brussels) , 5 December 1980, p. 2, in
EBISdESS* 1 & DeceaEef 1980, p. G- 2.
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mast be made. Until the new year, the Polish crisis was
marked by being distinctly different from the cases of
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In both of these latter two
cases, the Communist party was in the forefront of the
reform movement, rather than being dragged along as is true
in the Polish case. Unlike Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the
calls for reform in Poland were issued from outside of the
PUHP and were much more broadly based than the earlier
calls. However, recently, and certainly since February, a
breakdown within the party has become apparent and has
affected a dramatic change. This may portend the most
serious omen yet against the continuation of the Polish
experiment beyond the next few months. Strong arguments
have been made that in the past the issue at stake in East
European interventions has always been control of the local
communist party. 68 It is this control which seems to be in
jeopardy today.




Today, much of the world is wondering whether Poland^
current difficulties will trigger a Soviet response similar
to their interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia
(1968). The question is very complex and there are a variety
of avenues open which may provide answers to it. Basic to,
and early in, any discussion of soviet intervention must be
one question. What is Poland to the Soviet Onion?
Chekov, the nineteenth century Russian playwrite, once
wrote that the past "weighs upon a Russian mind like a
thousand-ton rock." With this in mind, it appears important
for the non-Russian observer to have an appreciation for
past Russian experiences. If Chekov is right, this can
render a glimpse of reactions and predispositions of the
current soviet decision Bakers. what follo-ws, therefore, is
a review of Soviet-Polish history which attempts to
illuminate the attitudes which the Soviets maintain of the
Poles, and the nature of the historic interaction.
Additionally, some attention will be paid to drawing a




Ironically, the conversion, by Catholic priests, of
Poland's first historical ruler, Mieszko I to Christianity
in 963 A.D. establishes the beginning of both the official
Polish history and the deep-rooted cultural conflict which
marks Poland's historic relationship with Russia. The
history of Poland since that date can be broken down into
two periods. During the first, which ended in 1697, Poland
was an important international actor. Copernicus, studying
at the Oniversity of Krakow, is today's most familiar
example of the heights to which Polish culture rose in the
golden age it experienced during the Jagiellonian Dynasty
(1368-1572). Poland's importance in the politico-military
arena is also clearly revealed by the role it played in the
relief of Vienna (1683), when Polish cavalry, operating in
a coalition army under the leadership of Sobielski (King
John III of Poland) defended the city and halted the advance
of the Turks into western central Europe.
The interplay between Russia and Poland for influence
and control had already begun during this first period when
Poland extended its boundaries west and south to include the
lands of historic Lithuania, modern Byelorussia and the
Ukraine, and the city of Kiev. The climax of this interplay
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occurred in 16 10 when Sigismund Il's Polish armies
capitalized on Russia's rime of Troubles and occupied Moscow
in support of the Thief, the Second Pretender to the Thrown
of Muscovy. 69 This event marked the nadir of Russian power.
The Polish occupation of the Kremlin ended in November 1612.
While Polish conversion to Catholicism marked the beginnning
of the contest for influence, the occupation of Moscow
shaded it with deep emotion.
As is frequently the case, seeds for change are sewn
long before the change they induce becomes evident. The
Polish prestige and influence evidenced during the relief of
Vienna in 1683 were undermined by a change made in 1572. In
that year, the last Jagiellonian king died leaving no heir.
The Polish response to this crisis was to invoke a
Constitution whose major article made the monarchy an
elective office. Unique among its European neighbors, these
changes opened the Kingdom to outside interference both
during succession crises and during the intervening years
when the now successful candidates catered to their foreign
benefactors.
69 In an interesting aside, Dmitri the False drew from the
Poles not only his support, but also his heritage.
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This change arose directly from internal politics. The
szlachta, the polish gentry, having fallen under the spell
of the Western ideas of liberty and freedom preserved these
for themselves by severely limiting the power of the king.
They further limited his power with another major provision,
called the liberum veto which allowad any single deputy in
the Sei m to veto any bill passed in that body. These are
early examples of a general Polish cultural trait of
intense, almost fierce, individualism. Clarifying the
ramifications of this trait, one observer has noted that
Polish individualism has been a serious impediment to their
efforts
to establish the institutions which, when they function,
assure the state a firm base of political and economic
concord that permits it to exercise its sovereignty to
the limits of strength and opportunity. 70
Several themes important to this study are already
evident in the first period of Poland* s history. One was
the Catholicization of Poland. This event served to
philosophically separate the Polish Slavs from the Russian
Slavs who maintained their Orthodoxy with its Byzantine
heritage. Catholicization may also have provided Poland with
the urge tc convert the Orthodox populations to the East.
™ Clifford R. Barnett. Poland: Its People, its Society, its
QJiiture(New Haven: Hraf Press, 1953") 7 p.~T.
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Another theme results from the occupation of Moscow
(1610-1611). Accomplished during a period of extreme Pussian
weakness, this event set the tone of the struggle at a basic
level. A final theme relates to the constraints which the
Polish culture was placing on its own political viability.
B. RUSSIAN ASCENDANCE
Russian recovery from and response to the 1610/1611
occupation was short in developing and leads to the second
period of Polish history, one which reveals a. fragmented,
weak, and divided Poland progressively falling under the
power of Russia. During the first Northern War (1654-1667)
,
Poland was unable to defend its own borders. Rising Russian
strength lead in 1667 to the Treaty of Andrusovo which
divided the previously exclusively Polish Ukraine with
Russia. During the Great Northern War (1700-1721) , further
trends in Polish culture and in Russo-Polish relations
became evident. During the later seventeenth century, the
Polish political situation was "ohaotic." Poland was headed
"toward political disintegration and anarchy.™ It was, with
a population of eight million, an "impotent giant." A
contemporary English diplomat described Poland. "This
unsettled nation [is] like the sea, it foams and
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roars. ..[but it] only moves when it is agitated by some
superior power." 71 Russia, occupied by Poland only ninety
years earlier, did not fail to capitalize on its new found
strength. Growing Russian preeminence over Poland resulted
not only from Russia's success at battle with the Swedes
during the Great Northern War, but also because Peter's
agents "learned to exploit the Polish Constitution and to
play the nobility against each other and the king." 72 This
is only the first of many curious examples revealing the
continuity of the patterns of interaction which have marked
these two countries for the last 350 years.
Political weaknesses, arising from the Polish political
culture continued to undermine the nation's strength. While
Russia's influence in Poland in the eighteenth century was
limited by its de facto nature, Polish political viability
was limited by its "wretched system of government." One
historian has written that "the triumphant class (the
szlacht a) failed to organize its power in such a manner as to
give the country an effective government." But his most
enlightening description depicted the nation living "in
71 Collection of the Imperial Russian Historical Society,
St.—Pe£ers~5urg;~1ffS?-133H7~TTXIX7~~22Z, ~ciTeS~5y~Ro"5erT~K.
Massie, Peter the Great (New York: Alfred A. Kaopf, 1980),
p. 228. "
72 Warren 3. Walsh, Russia and the Soviat anion (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Pfess7"T958r» ~p.~727.
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anarchy thinly concealed under the forms of an elaborate
republican Constitution." 73 These observations were also
shared by contemporary Russians. In 1762, one wrote
Poland is constantly being plunged into internal discord
and disorders which take up her whole attention; as long
as she preserves her Constitution she does not deserve
to be considersd among the European Powers. 7 *
C. CATHERINE AND THE PARTITIONS
Into this milieu entered Russia's Catherine the Great.
Her interest in Poland had far reaching importance. Her
first major act was to influence the election of Poland's
new King in 1763. Her preference was for Stanislaw
Poniatowski; it was a preference based on his loyalty to her
indubitably proven during their earlier romantic
association. Hec tactics to secure the election involved an
early, although by no means unparalleled, use of Russian
troops. Encamped around iarsaw during the election, the
psychological impact of their presence was sufficient to
secure Catherine's choice.
73 a. Bobrzynski, Dzieie Polski » Zarysie. 3 vols. (Cracow,
1890). 2:353, cited By R"oBeft~&.~ Cof37""The Second Partition
of £2land r (Cambridge : Harvard University press, 19Tb) , p.
7. Empaasis added.
7 * Letter from Chancellor H . V. Vorontsov to Peter III, cited
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The next few years proved quiat, but the Russian quest
for greater influence continued. In 1767, a major
confrontation over the severely limited rights of those
members of the Polish population who were Orthodox or
Protestant was engineered by Prince Nicholai Repnin, the
Russian Ambassador to Poland. A sound Russian purpose
existed for this choice. In a nots to Repnin, Nikita Panin,
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was considered
to be Catherine's mouthpiece, 7 s wrote
It is necessary to resolve the Dissident affair not for
the sake of propagating our faith and the Protsstants in
Poland, but for the sake of acguirina for ourselves,
through our cor feligionis ts and tna Protestants," a~Tirm
a.nd reliable party, with the legal right to participate
In all~^n"e affairs of Poland. 76
During the campaign for Dissident rights, Repnin was "in
every respect absolute monarch." 77 Again the pattern of
interaction reveals its curious continuity. Repnin wrote "I
will place 15,000 troops at the Diet, and the Diet will be
compelled to do what the Dissidents demand with the
75 Lord, The Second Partition, p. 4 7.
7 * Letter from Panin to Repnin cited by Sergei Mikhailovich
Solov'ev, Istoria Rossii s drsvneishikh vreaen. XXVII.
48 2-U83 (25""Xugu3T ~T7E7f, ~ ci£el ""b"y Kaplan, the First
Partition, p. 67. (emphasis added)
77 Third Earl of Malmesbary, ed., Diaries and Correspondence




protection of the Empress." 79 To ensure favorable votes,
uncompromising Poles were placed under house arrest. Despite
these measures, the initial attempts to secure these
Dissident rights eluded Catherines subordinates.
However, this situation was reversed when Repnin
proposed that Catherine be proclaimed the guarantor of the
Polish Constitution. Poles who were intransigent to this
new idea, including the Bishops of Krakow and Kiev, were
ordered arrested and imprisoned by the Russian Ambassador.
Without these strong opponents of Dissident reform, the
remaining Poles acquiesced to the demand that Catherine be
made the guarantor of their Constitution, which was
thereupon amended to provide for the rights of the
Dissidents.
This important period of Russian interaction with the
Poles was not yet complete. In response to Russia's
interference in Poland, a patriotic uprising occurred under
the leadership of the Bar Confederation. Typical of many
future Polish attempts to throw off Russian dominance, the
Confederation was strongly patriotic but weakly organized.
While considering support of the Bar Confederation, the
" Wladyslaw, Kono pczynski, 5a.zimierz £ulas]ci, zyciorys. p
16, cited by iSId., p. 3T.
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French wondered if it was "one of those ephemeral movements
to which Polish flightiness is given." The Preach emissary
from Loius XV, travelling in coanito, confirmed the
suspicion. It is easy to confuse whether he was talking of
historic or contemporary Poland. He found it in a "state of
confusion, dissension, ignorance, and disorder." 79 Further
evidence of the Confederation's weak organization came in
June 1768 when Russian troops crushed it one day before a
major element in Krakow joined the Confederation. Polish
defeat after four more years of warfare which sometimes was
fought with guerilla tactics, lead to the First Partition of
Poland in 1772.
1 • lk§. First P artition
The First Partition was conducted in concert with
Prussia and Austro-Hungary and saw limited areas on the
perimeter absorbed by the outside powers. Catherine
explained her actions during this period by invoking calls
for the return of "Russian lands" and the repatriation of
ethnic Russians, but these explanations were lame. The
subjects of Catherines interest were the population of
modern Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Unlike today, however,
during the eighteenth century, the former were referred to
7 ' Ibid., 97.
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as Lithuanians and the latter as the Cherkassian nation. a o
This clearly exposed Russian acceptance of the populations
non-Russian characters. Catherines interest was far lore
accurately explained by self-defense and acquizition of a
passage to Europe. But with the Partition, Russia had traded
IS facto influence throughout the whole Polish Commonwealth
for de jure control of only a small part. Clearly,
Catherine's goals had not yet been satisfied.
2. The Second Partit ion
A new chapter opened shortly after the French
Revolution in 1789 when, in 1791, the Poles adopted a
progressive and more liberal Constitution. The
liberalization lead in 1792 to the Targowica Confederation,
to whom the Icing, still Poniatowski, turned over control of
the state. The Confederation failed to be effective, and
Russia's expansive attitudes saw opportunity. One Russian
diplomat noted in late 1792, that "this nation [has] shown
itself so hopelessly perverse that it must be reduced to a
state of perpetual impotence to harm its neighbors." He
added that considerations to expand Russian control in
eo Lord, £he Second Partition, p. 4 2
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Poland wars "reinforced by the long-felt desire for the
finest acquizition the Empire could ever make." 81 Catherine
perfected her plans and only when they were set did she tell
the Prussians what their part would be. The Poles, much as
before, were unprepared. The Russian and Prussian move to
conduct the partition of the remainder of the Commonwealth
in 1793 came after the Poles had had sufficient time for
/military and diplomatic preparation. However, the Poles
were caught in a state of unreadiness. The open knowledge
that Catherine's opposition to the new Constitution was
growing, in combination with suspicious troop movements, was
not sufficient to alarm the Poles. A contemporary account
reports that on the eve of the partition, "Warsaw was never
more thronged or more brilliant" and compared Poles to
Pompeians, dancing over the volcano on their last day. 82
While Poles continued to behave in a pattern the
reader is growing accustomed to, the Russians, who had
reminded others that they never did anything halfway, 83 were
also predictable. Catherine's military commander in Warsaw,
«i Letter from Sarkov to S.R. Vorontsov, 8/19 November,
1792, Archif Knyasya Yorontsovo, 40 vols., Moscow 1876-1897,
XX:32,~cT£e3 By IBltf.71" sB5T"
82 j.i. Kraszewski. E2i§JS§. 5 czasie trzech rosbiorow, 3
vols., (Warsaw, 1905->9(J3T7 TII:TZ?, cifeH By I5ia\ , p. 284.
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General Igeistrom, refused to allow a single Polish regiment
or a single cannon from the Warsaw aresenal to be sent
against the Russians. 8 * The Second Partition of Poland,
which totally divided Poland and thus ended Polish state
existence, was accomplished more easily that the battles
which followed.
3» Pol ish De fiance and the Xki£i Partition
Polish military response again commenced after the
opportune time. Led by General Tadeusz Kosciuszko, who had
previously distinguished himself in the American
Revolutionary War, the Poles wrung out several victories.
Important was an early battle in which the General lead
sythe-bearing peasants to victory against professional
Russian troops. This success rallied Polish support for his
rebellion and contributed to victories in several more
battles, but timing and Russian pcedominace denied him a
victorious campaign. Following the Polish defeat at
Maciejowice, where Kosciuszko was captured, the Polish
rebellion faced inevitable defeat. However, it did not occur
until after Catherine's troops, under the command of General
Suvorov, 8S slaughtered not only the defenders but also the
M Lord, £he Second Partition, p. 3 95.




population of Praga, outside Warsaw. This ruthless act,
unnecessary in the military sense, underscored the enmity
felt between the two cultures. With the Russian defeat of
Kosciuszko*s rebellion, came the Third Partition of Poland.
D. RUSSIAN POLISH PROVINCE
During the eighteenth century, Russian strength flows.
Russian desire to expand combines with memories of Polish
interference and orients the Russians in part towards the
West. Russian influence over Poland grows by stages until,
under Catherine, Polish statehood has been extinguished.
This process is accompanied by ruthless acts which serve
only to increase the enmity already clearly in evidence.
While the second period of Polish history, referred to at
the beginning of this chapter, is not viewed as ending with
the Partitions, there is a notable delineation at this
point. The shifting balance of power which lead to the
Partitions becomes a status c[uo power balance which exists
throughout the nineteenth century and to which this review
now turns.
The history of Polish-Russian relations in the
nineteenth century started with Napoleon, but was punctuated
by major rebellions in 1830 and 1863. Between 1807 and 1809,
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Napoleon created the Duchy of Warsaw from the Prussian and
Austro-Hungarian partitions. French support for Poland had
always been high, and the French presence in the Duchy, with
the revolutionary encouragement which that provided to the
Poles across the Nieman River in the Russian Partition,
prompted Tsar Nicholas I to grant his Poland a new
constitution which gave it great autonomy and guaranteed the
freedoms of speech, press, and association while granting
special protection and priviledge to the Roman Catholic
Church. At the same time, the Tsar added "I have created
such organs of repression as will make the Poles understand
that they must not go beyond a certain limit." 86 While this
statement sounds moderate, it also bears a rasemblance to
modern Soviet statements regarding the limits of current
East European initiatives. At least one contemporary
conservative thinker expressed sharper views when he wrote
in 1811 that his nation's interests demanded that "there be
no Poland under any shape or name." 87
Napoleon's attack into Russia with the Grande Armee in
1812 was viewed by the Poles as another opportunity to
86 Walsh, Russia and the Soviet Union, p. 173.
87 Richard Pipes, ed. , Karamzin' s Memoir on Ancient and




regain their independence. Their military support of the
Arjee was praised by the Emporor. 3ut the venture failed,
and with the French retreat from Moscow through the Duchy
came Russian troops. The Congress of Vienna (1815) ceded
the Duchy to Alexander I.
1 • Revolution of 1830
Russian thought and attitudes towards Poland begin
to reflect a shift after 1815. As was implied in earlier
discussion, ethnically Russian territory was recovered with
the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667. Following the Partitions,
the new territories gained were called the "Polish
provinces," the "provinces detached from Poland," or simply,
"Polish lands." These titles reflected Russian acceptance
of the non-Russian character of the Polish territory in
question. However, after 1819, they came to be referred to
as the "Western provinces." 88 As the belief that Poland was
an integral part of the Russian Empire grew in Russian
minds, so to did the Polish desire to remove the Russian
yoke.
The Russian yoke was next assaulted by the November
1830 rebellion. It was started without any unity of




(Cambridge: Harvard 0niv§r3TTy~PT§337 T95^r7~|5~ 6.
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purpose. 89 Divisions existed within the revolutionary's and
between them and the general population. It commenced with
an ill-planned rebellion lead by the most junior officers.
They succeeded in expelling the Russian garrison from
Warsaw, but the pre-existing internal dissensions soon
weakened the revolutionaries. The Polish government
contributed further to the weak Polish response by waiting
too long to call up more Polish forces.
On the other hand, Nicholas I, of Russia, ordered
Russian troops into Poland to crush the Rebellion as soon as
he learned of it. The slow Polish reaction interacted with
the speedy Russian response in a predictable manner. Polish
disorganization and lack of unity were debilitating. In one
instance, General Dwernicki "fought a fine cavalry battle at
Boremb, but later, being insufficiently assisted b_y_ the
local insurgents, he was forced into Austria and out of the
war.'190 While noting the heroism of the Polish soldiers,





a 9 Ibid., p. 9.
90 W.P.Reddaway et al., Jhe Cambridge tjistgry of Poland. 2





For their unsuccessful rebellion, the Poles were
rewarded with loss of their autonomous status and increasing
efforts to Russify them. Tsar Nicholas I allegedly said
that he "knew only two sorts of Poles, those whom he hated
and those whom he despised." 92 A final reflection of Russian
attitudes towards the Poles was rendered by Pushkin, who in
To Russia 1 s Slander ers asserted his country's right tc crush
the Polish rebellion, and promised foreign interventionists
the "same treatment previously meted out to Napoleon." 93
Russia^ conviction that it possessed a right to Polish
territory was growing stronger with the passage of time.
Integration after 1830 included an act which made the
Russian ruble the official currency in Poland.
Another subject for dispute which arose during the
mid-nineteenth century was that of Pan-Slavism. Various
interpretations included those of Pan-Slavism and
Slavophilism. One contemporary writer addressed the
distinction between the two. Slavophilism, he noted,
reflected the views of the Poles and aimed at "independence
and equal dignity... of all branches of this great [Slav]
92 Wandycz, Soviet- Polish Relations, p. 3. The Poles also
shared a similar view of~tEe Fussians.
93 Ronald Hinglay, The Russian Sind (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 197777~P- ""T597"
73

tribe." This ran directly counter to the Pan-Slavism of the
Russians which, as Pushkin had said, was "understood as the
flowing of all Slav rivers into the Russian sea." 9 * Russian
Pan-Slavism "envisiged not a Slavic collaboratiDn in freedom
and equality, but a Russian domination over the Slavs." 9 *
This dispute marks another major philosophical difference
between the Poles and the Russians. It is time to return to
the chronological thread of this review.
After the 1830 Revolution, Russian domination
increased. It was signalled in part by Polish loss of
autonomy and by the monetary intergration of 1841. However,
following the Russian defeat in ths Crimean War (1854-1856),
this trend subsided. Adam Ulam notes that this defeat
brought to an end an ideological phase of Tsarist Russia's
foreign policy which had begun in 1815 at the Congress of
Vienna 96 and had been highlighted in part in the dispute
over Pan-Slavism. The turn away from ideological
considerations resulted in the easing of Russian domination
•• Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 11.
95 Encyclopaedia Britannic^ (1967). s.v. "Pan-Slavism," by
Hans"Tohn.
96 Adam 3. alam. Expansion and Coexistence, Soviet Foreign
Policy. 1917-1973, 2nd eo*7 (ffew Yorfc": HoPE, RTneEarf, and
Winston, inc. ,~T974) , p. 7.
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of Poland and this in turn lead almost directly to the
Revolution of 1863.
2. Revolution of J863
Phrases used to describe the Revolution of 1863 are
remarkably similar to those describing 1830, 1794
(Kosciuszko) , as well perhaps as the Bar Confederation
(1767) . This revolution, while the most heroic, was ill-
advised. « 7 The revolutionaries were again split between the
moderates and the radicals and apart from the peasants who
were indifferent or hostile to the revolt. This revolt was
also the bloodiest. Polish peasant soldiers, serving in the
tsarist army, were released in order to stiffen the
resistance against the revolt. When the insurgents
discovered this, those soldiers who were caught, were
hung. 98 Attempts by the Polish revolutionaries to gain
support from nearby nations strengthened traditional Russian
suspicions of collusion with the West." The war, at times
fought with guerilla methods, was concluded in 1864. Russia
defeated the Poles by accentuating the divisions within
97 Reddaway, Cambridge History, 11:384.
98 R.?. Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland
1856^1865 (London:—T"5e"A?HIone~Pf§"ss7~7?53r7 P- 2T7 -
99 Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 14.
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Polish society and by giving the Polish peasants their own
land.
This revolution was viewed very seriously by the
Russians. Mikhail Katkov, an ex-liberal, stated that "the
insurrection threatened the sacred interests of Russia. "too
Ronald Hingley notes that in Dostoevsky's novels, his most
"virulent contempt is reserved for the Poles:
topographically adjacent, Catholics, rebels against Russian
rule in 1863, and damned in all three capacities." This
contempt is evidenced by his frequent use, as a figure in
his novels, of the "wretched little Pole."i°i
While the Poles "had formerly possessed a spirit of
romanticism, both they and the Russians now adopted an
attitude of realism. That of the Russians was far more
pronounced. Poland became an occupied state and future
nation of Russia. A strong policy of Russif ication was
instituted. Russian became the sole language of
administration, Polish geographic names wera changed to
Russian names and the Kingdom of Poland unofficially became
wisla or '.fistula land. 102
100 ibid., p. 13.
ioi Hingley, Russian Mind, p. 148.
i° 2 Sandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 16
76

Pan-Slavism, with its two interpretations, gained a
third one when Sergei Solov^v wrote "Poles are called
renegades and traitors" and have "lost all right to
participate in the future greatness of Slavs." If this was
not enough, the Poles were determined by the ethnographic
congress held in Moscow in 1867 to be the "Judas of
Slavdom." Finally, "k Russian citadel and a huge orthodox
church in the center of Warsaw proclaimed to the world that
Wisla land was a Tsarist colony." 103 This firm Russian
reaction to the revolution of 1863 closes another phase.
Future developments were to be formed and determined by
forces new to the scene of Polish-Russian relations.
3. T.£e twentieth Century and the Polish Inter vention
In the latter nineteenth century, a new movement of
political thought was receiving attention throughout Europe.
Marx f s writings were read in Poland and his thoughts lead to
the formation of several parties. The major party was the
Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Its program adopted in 1892,
proclaimed as its aim an "independent democratic Polish
Republic." This aim accurately revealed Polish
interpretation of both Marx and Sngsls. The philosophy of
103 Hans Kohn, ed., The Mind of Modern Russia (New York
1962), p. 216, cited by~3ana7cz ,~5~ovie^-PglisK~K5lations, p
15 ana other references Ibid., p. "T5, ana" p~ T9.
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Polish communism linked the Marxian expression of class
exploitation with the Polish concern over foreign
oppression. *•* The growing strength of the PPS militia lead
to the first Polish clash with the Russians when PPS militia
exchanged shots with Russian gendarmes and soldiers in
Warsaw in November 1904. l ° 5 However, this small incident did
little to alter Poland's subjugation. Not until World War I
(WWI) did change appear possible. The importance of WWI was
prophetically outlined circa 1906 by one Pole whs understood
that although A ustro- Hungary and Prussia shared in the
partition of his country, Russia was the primary enemy and
that should war come to Europe, the Poles* final aim would
be their independence. This Pole, an ex-socialist of the
PPS, was named Jozef Pilsudski. l <> 6
WWI saw Poland again become the battleground for
other nations 1 disputes, but with the destruction of the
three partitioning powers in that war, Poland seized its
independence. With independence came the need to define and
control Poland^ boundaries. Soviet-German collusion as
German troops withdrew from Poland allowed tha Soviets to
x o* It is interesting to note that both Marx and Engels
endorsed the polish smuggle for independence.
l0S Wandycz, Soviet- Polish Relations, p. 27.
*o* ibid., p. 31.
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occupy Polish territory and served to deny the Poles control
of their territory. The need to define and control these
lead the Poles, under the leadership of Pilsudski, to launch
an attack on the infant Soviet Onion. Newly formed Polish
units moved deep into Soviet territory in 1919 but were then
forced to retreat to the gates of Warsaw. A counterattack,
ordered by Pilsudski, reestablished control of the Polish
frontiers and the two sides finally ended the Polish
Intervention with the signing of the Treaty of Riga.
Closer examination of statement made by the
participants reveals a Soviet attitude largely unchanged
from that of their forebearers, the Tsarist Russians. Lenin
spoke of Poland as "a Wall." 107 Another Soviet statement
related the Soviet perception that Poland was either a
bridge or a barrier to the spread of Communism. It added,
poignantly, that if she was the latter, she must be smashed
while if she was the former, she must become a Soviet
Poland. 108 In a similar vein, Karl Radek, a Galician Polish
Jew by birth, wrote in Izvestia
[Poland] has Droved to us by deed that she cannot exist
side by side* with Soviet Russia. If the white guard
"Russo-Polish107 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1967) f s.v.
War, n~By Kazimlerz Hacie^'Smogo rzewski.
loa Joseph Korbel , Poland between East a.nd West (Princeton:
Princeton tlniversity"*"?ress, ~T9"53J"7 ?7 T1.~
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Poland cannot exist side by side with Soviet Russia-
then a Soviet Poland will.*"
Statements like these left little of the Soviet political
aspirations unclear.
The comments above referred to Poland, the country.
Others, equally poignant, referred to the Poles, themselves.
Much has been said of the vituperative comments printed in
Soviet papers in 1920 while the Russians had the upper hand.
Voennoe Delo, a Soviet military daily, referred to the Poles
as "Lakhs" - a derogatory term. After these and other
statements, Lenin instructed the military papers to tone
down their chauvinistic overtones and insisted on promoting
the distinction "between the Polish lords, and the peasants
and workers. »i»o However, shortly thereafter, he underscored
the tactical nature of these instructions when he wrote
"from a political point of view it is most important to kill
Poland. ll1
The similarity of the Soviet views to their Tsarist
heritage was not the only continuity evident. Commenting on
the Poles, Dzerzhinskii wrote that when the Soviets reached
109 ibid., p. 42.
110 Leninskii Sbornik (Moscow, 1942). XXXIV:293, cited by
Wandycz~r"*5ovi.e£:rPoTIsh Rela tions, p. 201.
n* Trotsky Archives, file A, August 1920, cited by Korbel,
£2lia4 between E ast a nd West, p. 51.
80

Bialystok, the first Polish city, they "felt no power." He
wrote further that the leaders of the Polish Communist Party
"did not know how to master the masses or the political
situation." He added "they miss a leader - a Lenin." 112 He
was well based in his comments; he was a Pole by birth.
While Polish political leadership was wanting, its
military leadership was better. The counterattack lead by
Pilsudski in 1920 which reestablished the Polish boundaries
illuminated the Polish tendency to wait until the last
opportunity to organize. Many Poles remember that "the guns
near Warsaw became a tocsin which warns and awakens." 113
E. INDEPENDENT POLAND EMERGES
With the Treaty of Riga came peace. Marshal Pilsudski
retired and the Poles continued to operate in manners that
have never stood the test of reality. The constitution
provided for a weak executive.
Pree elections brought into the legislature a multitude
of political groups and factions unable to produce a
staole majority except in extreme situations. .. Numerous
112 F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Dyeynik: Pisma k rodnym (Moscow.
1953), p. 258-260, letters~of~T7 an3~25~AugusT7 >920 , cited
by Wandycz, Soviet- Polish Relations , p. 230.
113 Trampczynskii on September 24 1920, 5prawozdanie
stenograficzne 1919-1921 (Sejm astawodawczy sTP.
f
C"LT7TiI73, "cifed by~7an3ycz, Sov^t;Polish Relation, p. 241.
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changes in cabinets, frequent parliamentary crises,
continuous bickerings, personal quarrels, and clashes of
ambitions
marked Polish government. 114
Themes of the Polish political culture and Russo-Polish
relations, already familiar, were given added credence by
the experiences of independent Poland between the wars.
After observing that Poland's parliamentary democracy was
"reviving the anarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries," Marshal Pilsudski returned to the leadership of
the country in 1926. lls Colonel Beck, his Sinister of
Foreign Affairs, noted that "the authority of Marshal
Pilsudski was the decisive factor in the ... affairs of
Poland. "ii* The New York Times using the same metaphor as
the eighteenth century English diplomat, supported this view
when its obituary noted that "no other such human rock to
dominate and direct the Polish tide" existed after his
death. n ?
n* 3arnett, £oland: Its People, p. 21. In another
revealing aside," ~^he "Cons^i^ufion of 1921 officially
recognized the "leading position" of the Catholic Church.
This is remarkably similar to the current dispute over the
"leading role" of the Communist Party for Solidarity. Ibid.,
p. 71.
us Ibid., p. 22.
116 Colonel Jozef Beck, Pinal Rep_ort. (New York: Robert
Speller and Sons, Publishers, rnc7,"T757) , p. 26'4.
117 M§.w Yorjc Times, .13 May 1935, cited by Bohdan B.4 ' i £ I2SLk r u n i^jd usa D o na a
BudurowyczT Poll sh=Soviet Relations (New York: Columbia
University Press, iWBjf, p. 727
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Marshal Pilsudski's foreign policy to the East called
for the establishment of buffer states from the Baltic
republics through Byelorussia and the Ukraine to Romania, on
the Black Sea. His desire to unite these in alliance
against the Soriets flew directly in the face of the
Soviet/Russian urge to open the West. Tension with the
Soviet Union reached the level of disturbing Soviet military
activities in 1930, 1936, and 1938.m Soviet attitudes
registered little change as Molotov revealed when he called
Poland, in 1939, "an ugly off-spring of Versailles. "* **
Hitler 1 s intrigues allowed the Soviets to realize the
partial fulfillment of their designs to regain control of
Poland later that year. The Polish Government in Exile
(London Poles) , with whom the Russians maintained minimal
contact was "rivsn by dissensions and clashing views as to
how to deal with [the Soviet might ]. I,l2 <> Soviet relations
deteriorated as their battlefield successes multiplied.
Relations were finally broken off over the Polish protest of
the rather clear Soviet murder of thousands of Polish
officers in Katyn Forest. A final Soviet underscoring of
us ibid., p. 8 and p. 83, Beck, Final Report, p. 168
119 Ulam, Expansion and Coe xistence, p. 210.
120 Ibid., p. 3H2.
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their position towards the nationalist Polish elements came
with their total lack of support of the Warsaw Uprising
which lead to the extinction of the remaining Polish
nationalists. With the end of WWII, the Soviets were in
position to reestablish their traditional hegemony over
Poland.
F. A NOTE ON POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE
This review has also provided sxamples of the Polish
political culture. Jan Szczepanski, currently President of
the Polish writers* Union, has provided a succinct list of
traits of the Polish political culture. Of these traits,
three have been well developed and are simply listed below.
They are:
1) the cult of individualism,
2) the intransigence of the gentry to subordination, and
3) the inability to organize collectively for any long tarm
efforts.
Pour more traits are listed by Szczepanski . One is
bravery. The case of Kosciuszko's sythe-bearing peasants is
clear evidence. Napoleon also gave praise on this point when
3t*

he said, "I love Poles on the battlefield, they are brave
people." 121 A second trait related is of a highly developed
feeling of honor and personal dignity. Harder to support,
one indication of this juality is provided by another
observation from the Napoleonic wars. In writing of hte
allied contingents of the Gra nde irmee, one author wrote,
"by far the most loyal and aggrassive were the Poles." 122
Szczepanski also felt that ieep patriotism and national
pride were notable qualities of the Polish political
culture. 123 Poland has experianced greatness and
subordination each for long periods of its thousand-year
history. Cultural trait weaknesses did not appear evident
during its period of power, and were key to its fall.
Later, analysis will focus on whether a fundamental or
significant change has occurred and is contributing to the
success, thus far, of the current course of events unfolding
in Poland today.
i2i Eugene Tarle. Napoleon ' s Invasion of Russia (New York:
Octagon Books, 1971J", p. TCT37
122 R.F. Delderfield, The Retreat from Moscow (New York:
Atheneua, 1967), p. 25.





This review posed a question at the opening. What is
Poland to the Soviet anion? The clearest answer to this
question is provided by a Russian who wrote in 1811. "Let
foreigners condemn the Partition of Poland - we took what
was ours. 11124 Since then, they have had almost one hundred
seventy years to build in their minds the legitimacy of
their claims. Indeed, this is not pure speculation. Dmitri
Simes has stated that there are still people in high
government positions in the Soviet anion who cannot refer to




But there are also other answers. Poland is a
culturally different entity. The combination of cultures
has developed a pattern of domination of one by the other
over a period of almost four hundred years. Historically,
and continuing to this day, Poland has been the gateway to
Europe and the conquerors thouroughf are to Moscow. Chekov's
observation on the weight of history underscores this
importance. Finally, Poland is a land whose people have
12* pipes, Karamzin 's Memoir, p. 132.
123 Interview with Dmitri Simes, Johns Hopkins School for




evidenced an inability to govern themselves and who thus
pose a continual nuisance and threat to Russian/Soviet
security.
While these are the Soviet claims on Poland, they have
only been able to exercise them when Polish culture was
anarchic. Is there a change today? Has Poland overcome
organizational problems and prepared in time? These must be
questions which are weighing heavily on the minds of the




In the last chapter, we examined the historical
interplay of Russia and Poland in an effort to gain an
appreciation for Poland from the Soviet perspective. While
this revealed how the current events challenge that
Soviet/Russian worldview, it offered only one view of
Poland's significance. At a lavel of analysis which
considers shorter-term ramifications there are many other
challenges. It is to the Soviet stakes which these
challenges attack that this analysis now turns.
At the root of the current disturbance is the Soviet
role in and control of Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe is to
the Soviets unlike any other area of the world because
there, rather than seeking additional influence, the Soviets
are attempting to prevent loss of an established and
internationally recognized influence. 12 * The nature of this
influence is nowhere more clearly characterized than in the
words of Leonid Brezhnev. "It is an invincible military
126 Andrzej Korbonski, "Eastern Europe and the Soviet




union, characterized by a unity of world views, a unity of
goals, and a unity of will. nl27
In one sense, Soviet attempts to secure influence in
Eastern Europe since World War H have been characterized by
the words cohesion and viability. 128 Cohesion implies
conformity to the Soviet model and, conceptually, leads to
absolute control. This absolute control can only be
maintained with physical force. Because of the extreme cost
of this, the Soviets have tried to balance the goal of
cohesion with that of viability, a quality that lends
legitimacy to the East European political structures. The
history of postwar Eastern Europe then reflects the shifting
equilibrium between these two concepts, and today 1 s
difficulties can be seen as a soviet dilemna between the
two. Just what are the soviet stakes in Poland? What is
the threat to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the
Council for Hutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) ? How does
Poland challenge the soviet model for a domestic political
system? Are there challenges which strike directly at the
*** Robert Rand, The Polish Crisis and Soviet Foreign Policy
(Radio Liberty ffesearcS BuIIefln 3T57BTJ, "Hunich, T2
September 1980), p. 1.
i2« J.F. Erown, Relations between the Soviet. anion and its




hearts of Russians? What are the competing interests the
Soviets may have to trade off?
A. CHALLENGES TO THE EAST EUROPEAN CONTROL STRUCTURES
The principle structures created by the Soviets to
secure control of Eastern European countries collectively
have been the WTO and the CMEA. While the structures
themselves are a quarter century old, the manner of their
use has evolved since they were established. Each of them
must be addressed in detail.
1. Warsaw Treaty Organ ization
Today, the Soviets station two tank divisions with
approximately 35,000 troops and 650 tanks in western Poland.
Their disposition is indicative of a role against a threat
envisioned to lie further to the west. Conventional wisdom
calls for Poland to play an important role in any future
European war. It is vital as a resupply, reinforcement and
communications link to Warsaw Pact forces in East Germany
(GDR) . It is perhaps more important as an assembly area for
Soviet second echelon forces necessary in any offensive
action planned according to current Soviet military
doctrine. Finally, it is anticipated that Polish airfields
and seaports would replace ones farther to the West, in the
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GDR, which are expected to be lost early in any scenario. 129
These make Poland's contribution to the Warsaw Pact clear.
Any instability in Poland must jeopardize future Pact
effectiveness.
But the traditional view of the WTO which sees it
primarily as a response to counter the threat of NATO and to
defend East Europe and the Soviet Union from Western
aggression must be questioned. The WTO has another
important function. At the 24th and 25th Party Congresses
(April 1971 and February 1976, respectively) Leonid Brezhnev
said that the WTO "has served and continues to serve as the
main center for coordinating the foreign policy activity of
the fraternal countries." 130 Statements by Soviet General S.
M. Shtemenko, former commander of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization, are even more illuminating. The mission of the
WTO is "supression of counterrevolutionary and aggressive
action against socialist countries." 131 Lest there be any
doubt, Shtemenlco added that the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 was an exampls of such a- mission.
129 "Poland's Geography: Russia's Gateway to the West," Drew
Hiddleton, New York Times, 6 April 1981, p. A- 11.
130 Christopher Jones, "Soviet Hagemony in Eastern Europe:
The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military
Intervention," World Politics 29 (January 1977)
, p. 222.
i3i ibid., p. 232.
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Offering a final piece of corraborating evidence are
the war plans of the only two East European countries who
have developed even nominally viable unilateral defense
plans. The threat envisioned by both Yugoslavia and Romania
numbers between .75 and 1.25 million troops who would
operate in a non-nuclear environment. 132 This threat
contrasts with the general conception of a European war as
recently popularized in General Sir John Hacket^s The Third
World Mar, Aug ust 1985 but bears greater similarity with
previous interventions legitimized by the WTO.
A corollary to the second mission identified by
Shtemenko is to limit the establishment of just such
military organizations as the Yugoslavs and the Romanians
have. It is not without reason that these are the only two
countries in the Soviet Bloc which can also be characterized
by their much greater freedom from Soviet guidance.
Questionable loyalty of Poland*s 350,000 man citizen«s
militia (not previously addressed) must be causing the
Soviet military great uneasiness. 133
132 Christopher Jones, "The Warsaw Pact: Military Exercises
and Military Int erventions," &rmed F°££es and Society
(Fall 1980)
, p. 6.
1 33 Middleton, Ne_w York rimes, 6 April 1981.
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The Soviets have sought to limit the independence of
the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) armies by keeping key
elements of logistics in the areas of communications,
transport and supply under Soviet control. Subject to
greater argument are claims that special units, such as the
rocket and air defence forces, are under the command of
Soviet officers and would effectively remain outside the
control of the NSWP organizations of which they are legally
apart. »3*
If the principle purpose of the WTO is to maintain
the Soviet position in NSWP nations, as Sen Shtemenko
stated, then current activities in Poland pose a serious
challenge to the Soviet stake of an effective WTO, even
though the Poles have gone to great lengths to acknowledge
their WTO responsibilities.
2. C.ouncJ.1 for a utua 1 Economic Assistance (CMEA)
Continued viability of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) is a second Soviet stake. While
in the early years of its existence the CMEA was a mechanism
which made Soviet exploitation of East European industrial
capability more efficient, the 1970* s witnessed increasing
integration of the member states. In July, 1971, the CMEA
is* ibid., p. 18.
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adopted a "Comprehensive Program" leading to the afore-
mentioned long-term economic integration through
transnational enterprise cooperation. This was followed in
1975 by the first Joint Coordinating Economic Plan. This
plan was distinct from the national plans. It first
targeted raw materials, minerals, and mineral fuels. One
example of the ventures which followed these agreements is a
company named PetroBaltic. The USSR, GDR, and Poland
established it to explore and develop oil fields in the
Baltic Sea. Coincidentally, its headquarters were located
in Gdansk.
The integration desired by the Soviets and called
for in these agreements are seriously threatened by the
unrest in Poland. During the August strikes, 3altic
seaports in the USSR and the GDR were forced to handle
Polish bound cargo which could not go through the
strikebound Polish ports. This additional burden was not
carried without expense to the GDR and the USSR. The
disturbance of the CMSA plans and the national economic
plans which started then has continued. In December 1980,
the GDR claimed that "no deliveries of Polish anthracite
coal from Silesia have been delivered in recent months" and
that this was "forcing slowdowns in the production of
9U

electricity and steel". * 3S Increased exports from the GDR to
Poland have resulted in shortages within the GDR itself.
In evidence of the Soviet awareness of this stake
were meetings between Polish Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw
Jagielski and the soviet GOSPLAN chief Nicholai Baibaicov
held in late December. Specific topics of discussion
included the plan for Soviet-Polish cooperation in the
period 1981-1985.
With coal production in Poland down by 25%, and
other production diminished to lesser, though still
significant degrees, the Soviets have ample evidence to
support fears that their plans for coordinated economic
development will be thwarted. 136
B. CHALLENGES TO THE SOVIET MODEL
The two regional extranational control structures
discussed above are only one group of challenges and stakes
which the current Polish situation threatens. A second
group of stakes currently challenged are of increasingly
fundamental value to the Soviets because they constitute a
latent threat to the style of Soviet communism. These
135 Easkinslofi. Star, 7 December 1980.
136 The section on the economy in Chapter I provides greater
detail of these current difficulties.
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challenges to the Soviet lodel include the topics of party
control, national economic management, and ideology.
Potential ramifications of unsatisfactory answers to these
questions are amplified by the last topic to be addressed in
this section, that of spillover into other nations of
Eastern Europe.
1 • Payty Control
Party control is paramount to the Soviet system of
national political organization. It is manifested and
promoted in a variety of ways, many of which are being
challenged in Poland today.
One aspect of party control is the preeminence of
the party. Dual power, which arises in many situations when
the party has lost its "leading role" gained a very bad
reputation in the Soviet mind during the revolution when the
Bolsheviks controlled Petrograd and the Provisional
Government controlled Moscow. neither government was
effective during the period of March-October 1917 while this
situation existed. V.I.Lenin's views of the dangers of dual
power must haunt Soviet leaders daily.
This Soviet sensitivity has not inhibited Kania from
routinely referring to the dyarchy arising within Poland
today. From his perspective, and not his alone, the
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Solidarity trade union has assumed the role of a political
institution which is juxtaposed to the Polish United
Workers Party (PtfWP) . Lent greater significance because its
author is an East German dissident is Robert Havemann's
observation that
Allowing free trade unions means nothing less than that
the only big working class organization recognized by
the masses as their representative is to be independent
of the party and thus of the Politburo.
In his words, this spells the "end of power of the
Politburo. "137
The role of Solidarity as a competing power center
is only one way in which the prescription of party control
has been attacked by recent developments in Poland. Another
is in the weakening of the system of nomenklatura. This
system allows installation of approved communist party
members into all organizations of a country. It provides for
the necessary control by and feedback to the ruling
communist party. While claiming one million members of PUWP
in its own membership, Solidarity has no nomenklatura. This
underscores the separation of the power of Solidarity from
137 ««dpa Cites GDH Dissident's Letter on Events in Poland,"




that of the POWP and mast be difficult for the Soviets to
accept.
Party control is also being attacked in a variety of
other ways. One is in the weakened security services.
Solidarity's success at obtaining and dessiminating a "state
secret" document in November 1980 must be viewed with horror
by a variety of Soviet leaders. Another attack on party
control comes with the abolition of strict censorship and
the decision to open the media to the Catholic Church and
the trade unions. This is of profound significance.
Control of the media is a central requirement for party
control. One observer viewed it as so important that in
August he wrote that it would be the sticking point for
Moscow. 138 Again, from these discussions, and those in
Chapter I, it is evident that party control is facing a
broad and serious challenge in Poland today.
2. Soviet Sodjii of Economic Management
Economic problems in Poland were previously
discussed. Problems of inadequate incentives, worker apathy
induced by disguised unemployment, poor consumer goods and
services, housing scarcities, and inefficient agriculture
138 "soviet Appears to Accept Polish Unrest Calmly So Far,"
!%* I2£j£ £i.2L§§# 23 August 1980, p. 3.
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limit per capita productivity in Eastern Europe to something
less than that of Western Europe and are a reflection of
systemic problems arising from the Soviet system of economy
and the organization of production. "Yet the Soviets shy
away from economic experimentation and reform because of its
short run economic costs and its potential political
dangers." 139 This reticence to experiment was amply
demonstrated when the chairman of SOSPLAN wrote that "there
is no and cannot be any alternative to centralized control
for a unified national economic complex. »i*o Surrender to
the demands made by solidarity "means the negation of the
state f s economic functions and the party's leading role." 141
Current Soviet concern over this challenge is supported by
quotes to the effect that V.I. Lenin "was sharply against
this."
While the problems and direction of attempts at
reform are not agreeable to the Soviets, they are certainly
aware of reality. Polish problems are similar to problems
experienced throughout the Soviet/East European Bloc. They
139 J. Triska. "Soviet-East European Relations," in The
Soviet Oni on: Looking to the Eighties, ed. Robert Wesson
(Stanford: "Hoover"Instifution Press7~T980) , p. 56.
*• Moscow Planovoye Khozya stv o No. 2, 9 January 1981, p.
6-17, in FBI5-P55 a, 1 T*HatfgliT?8 1 . Annex.
i*i »7.i. Lenin on the Trade Unions," Moscow, Pravda, 25
September 1980, p. 2, in F BIS-
U




are more acute simply because they are more advanced.
Indicative of this sensitivity are actions such as those
taken by the Czechs in August 1980 (during the strikes) when
Czech party groups were admonished to "heed workers
suggestions. "t*2
?. Ideology
One should not fail to mention that at the heart of
many of the challenges discussed both above and below is the
stake of Soviet ideology. It is closely bound to the
legitimacy of Soviet actions and goals. At a specific level,
challenges of how trade unions are integrated within
society, the economic organization of society, and the role
of the party within society all raise questions of the
Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology. But ideology is being
V
even more fundamentally challenged. One scholar has written
that
"The raisoii d 1 e tre of the Soviet communist party is to
fulfill an ideological mission to transform both Russia
and the international society first into socialism and
then ultimately""to fulI~comiiunism, as defined by Marx
and Lenin." 1 * 3
** "In Businesslike and Efficient Manner." Rude





Evidence of a more general echo within Eastern Europe
increases the drama of the events occuring in Poland today.
•• Sp illover into East ern Europe
This analysis returns to the familiar root stake and
challenge-control of Eastern Europe. Do these problems,
these precedents, foreshadow unrest elsewhere in Eastern
Europe? Both suspicion and evidence tend to answer this
question in the affirmative. Rendering the clearest
evidence is the perception of other Eastern European leaders
as reflected in their recent activities and statements.
In Czechoslovakia, increasing attention has been
given to insuring adequate food supplies and stress has been
placed on worker- management relations.* While the role of
the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia in no way compares
with its role in Poland, it is intriguing to note that
Gustav Husak*s message to a Catholic professor on the
occasion of his 70th birthday received media attention. In
his greeting, the Czech CP chairman noted the clergyman 1 s
"highly appreciated public activity, significant
contributions to the development of socialist society, and
the positive development of relations between the church and
* Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report/263, 30
October, 1980, p. 4.
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the stats." 1 * 5 While this single report may reflect less, it
appears to be high praise for a non-Communist member of the
Czech society. This is only one way the East European
states are demonstrating their increased sensitivity to the
Polish events.
The GDR has reacted somewhat differently. Lying
between the •liberal 1 West Germany and a Poland struggling
for liberties, the salvation of Erich Honecker's communist
regime has become his absolute priority. 146 A very harsh
tone towards both Poland and the PEG give some credence to
the observation that Honecker has probably adopted the
strategy which considers the best defense to be a strong
offense. 147 Intervention in Poland may cause unpredictable
events in the GDR because of the major strains which exist
within the country. 149
Other Eastern European countries show less
sensitivity. Questions have arisen over potential trouble
within Romania, but the threat seems to be less rabidly
t«i CTK(Prague), 29 January 1981, in FBIS-EEU, 3 February
1981, p. D-14.
i*6 "pishing in Troubled Waters," Bonn. Die Welt, 16
December 1980, in FSIS_^WE, 17 December 1980, p7~J-S.
147 "Tension-Proof East Sermany, II—The PEG, an Intimate
Enemy," Paris, Le Monde, 11 February 1980, in FBIS^EFU, 17
February 1980, p. fr5.
*« Washington Star., 7 December 1980.
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regarded. Hungary, quietly conducting an economic
experiment far from the Soviet norm has gone so far as to
invite Walesa for a visit while noting the "unabated
interest in the Polish issues" during the Hungarian trade
union's congress held during mid-December, 1980. Indeed,
interest throughout Eastern Europe in what has been called a
third model of political organization is generally high
while degrees of sensitivity vary across a wide spectrum.
The Soviet fear of a spillover of the contagion of Polish
reform is sufficiently supported by evidence to be
considered important. While pre-dating the August events,
words from a purported manifesto written by East German mid-
and high-level officials accurately reveals what must be the
one Soviet concern.
The worldwide tendency of the international worker's
movement will result In the decay of the Moscow theory
and practice. Creative, undogmatic, democratic-
humanitarian communism is developing. 1 * 9
C. DIRECT CHALLENGES TO THE USSR
Of a uniquely different nature are a final group of
stakes. Those already discussed had direct impact on Soviet
control of Eastern Europe. This concluding set of stakes is
*• Jiri Valenta, "Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe,"
Problems in Communism, 27 (March-April 1973), p. 53.
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made up of those which directly challenge OSSR. Continuing
from the last section is spillover, but now into the Soviet
Union itself.
1 • Spillover of Trade Onion Move ment s into the OSSR
Question: What is proletarian internationalism?
Answer: That's when there* s no meat in Moscow
and there are strikes in Poland.
As many jokes do, this one gives a unique
understanding of the Soviet sensitivity to spillover. The
cities can be as easily reversed in the joke as in reality.
Greatest opportunities for the spillover into the Soviet
Onion arise from increased worker militancy and increased
expressions of nationalism. The first attacks the current
socio-economic order while the second attacks the political
order.
Trade unions play an important and particular role
in this transformation. Lenin and Trotsky disputed the role.
Trotsky argued that trade unions were a mere adjunct of the
proletarian state apparatus while Lenin 1 s conception of
their role was much more emphatic. "Only in close
cooperation with and under the direct leadership of the
party of the working class" could they fulfill this role.
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Long and continuing Soviet animosity towards Trotsky, and
the semblance of a Trotskyite trade union in Poland today
stoke the fire of Soviet indignation and concern yet
further.
Soviet workers have provided the authorities with
what they percieve to be serious and apparently growing
problems. Contributing further evidence of the Soviet
sensitivities is the elusiveness of data on this subject.
From the rumored bloody suppression of the Novocherkassk
strike of the early 1960's, the Soviet workers have
proceeded much in the manner of the Poles, that is, with
increasing wisdom. Strikes at the Togliatti automobile
plant were followed in the winter of 1977-1978 with the
formation of the Free Association of Workers headed by
Vladimir Klebanov. His organization was active for several
months during the summer of 1978 until his detention and
subsequent "treatment" at a psychiatric hospital in
Dnepropetrovsk. Following him came Vladimir Sorisov, leader
of the Free Interprofessional anion of Workers (SMOT). He
was imprisoned in 1980 and later exiled to the West. These




However, recently, evidence has come to light of a
quantum leap in organization of unofficial Soviet trade
unions. In an interview in March 1981, Alexander Ginsberg
claimed that the Polish events are having an "enormous
effect in the USSR." He revealed a new underground
organization existing in seventeen large soviet cities
including Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and Novosibirsk. 150
If this report is true, the Soviets have much reason to fear
hearing the Polish echo in Moscow. Given their brutal
handling of these tendencies in the past, the observer must
conclude that the Soviet sensitivity in the face of
increasingly strong opposition is correspondingly
heightened.
2. Spillover of JSxEr. ess 2,0ns of. Nationalism i nto the
gssg
Concern over the trade union movement is only one of
two major forms which spillover can take up. A second is in
the form of intensified nationalism. Events in Lithuania
and Estonia have demonstrated this possibility. Estonia has
presented the most significant problem especially since
September 1980. In late September, twenty dissidents from
iso "polish Unrest in the Soviet anion." Oslo,
Arbeiderbladet, * March 1981, in FBIS^USSR, 6 March 1981, p.
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the Baltic republics issued a statement which congratulated
Walesa for his success in part for bringing about democratic
reforms. tsi xt about the same time, school children
protested in Estonia for "complete independence for
Estonia." This was accompanied by a strike at a local
tractor factory. In late October, the "Appeal of the
Pourty" echoed the school children's demands. tsa Soviet
concern was amply demonstrated by Yuri Andropov's sudden
visit and equally sudden firing of his KGB chief in Talinn.
Trouble in the Baltic republics has apparently not
been limited to Estonia. The borders of Lithuania were
closed to Poland in July, 1980, during the most initial
stages of the Polish strikes. Subsequently, other
unexplained closures of the Republic' s borders to foreigners
have occurred. These challenges are of the highest order of
magnitude since they threaten the continued existence of an
unchanged OSSR. Difficulties have also been noted in the
Ukraine where trade union questions are subject to
combination with nationalistic urges.
While clear evidence sxists that the Soviets have
ample reason to be concerned with internal security and
151 Stadium News Abstracts, No. 4, October 1980, p. 8.
152 "Appeal of the 40," Svenska Dagbladet (Stockholm) , 10
February 1981, in FBIS_0SS|7"T9Tebfuafy~TF8f, p. R-95.
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challenges to the current economic order, more strident and
effective control of information has lead Roy Medvedev to
believe that this chance remains small. lS3 As always, in
questions of difference between reality and perception, the
latter has greater weight. The chance for spillover into
the Soviet anion to occur must be on Soviet minds
continually.
D. COMPETING STAKES
Thus far the discussion has been limited to the stakes
which have been raised by the events in Poland. However,
these are not the only stakes which the Soviets have.
Others compete with the first and add to the challenge of
the Soviet decision making process. One stake of major
importance to the Soviets is detente. While essentially dead
with the OS, the spirit of a selective detente within
western Europe is still very much alive. While the long term
Soviet intentions are heatedly argued, certain short-term
benefits seem clear. With the naissance of detente, the
Soviets were able to maintain their economic system and
their domestic order without reform while making up for the
is3 "Moscow Does Not Fear 'Polish Contagion*," La




inefficiencies of both of these with increased trade with
the West.
Since August of 1980, the Europeans have made it very
clear that all aspects of detente would end upon the event
of a Soviet intervention in Poland. The Italians issued a
communique of non-interference in Poland in the middle of
December. The Germans, whose Qst^olitik hinges on relations
with Poland, and who are the West's largest trade partner
with Poland, would be expected to have the most to lose with
the end of this selected detente. Not withstanding this, on
December 9, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt warned the Soviets
against intervention. Klaus von Dohnanyi, the Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs, clarified the German position by
announcing shortly thereafter that West European help would
only occur in the absence of outside interference in
Poland's internal affairs. The French have made similar
statements. Although the new French government's attitude
vis-a-vis Poland has not been made clear, Francois Poncet,
the former French foreign minister, agreed with West
Germany's position on Poland stating that "the Paris and
Bonn leaders have identical feelings . •»»* The British
109

position is not unlike those of the French and Germans.
Lord Carrington, British Foreign Secretary, noted that the
cost of Soviet intervention in Poland would include the end
of detente. Indeed, this level of European unity has not
been seen for years. West Germany's Foreign Minister, Hans
Dietrich Genscher, spoke for the European's when he said
that their combined position "was being assessed uniformly
and in full accord.
"
l55 The end of detente would mean the
loss of western technology, aid and agricultural products.
Perhaps the largest single loss would be the proposed
pipeline which the Soviets are hoping to build with $11
billion of financing and equipment from West Germany. At
writing, the fate of this pipeline is already in jeopardy
due to rising European interest rates. While interest rates
have been blamed, this may signal Soviet acceptance of the
fact that, politically, the loss is inevitable.
However, the end of detente with western Europe is not
all the Soviets stand to lose. The Soviet economy needs
detente because it is already approaching severe growth
limitations. It is already currently involved in supporting
Cuba and Viet Nam and its agriculture has never been strong.
155 "Genscher Concerned by Eastern Criticism of Poland,"




The Polish debt, already extensively covered, would become a
Soviet responsibility upon their intervention. Given the
limitations within their economic system, this additional
burden would be very expensive both financially and
socially.
A third competing stake which the Soviets have lies in
their relations with the Communist Parties of Western
Europe. Eurocommunism is an affliction which causes the
Soviets great concern. Its foundation shares with the
Soviets the same observations and beliefs of Marx. This
allows it to appear very similar to the Soviet Communism.
If appearances reflected the perceived reality,
Eurocommunism would bode no ill for the Soviets. It is,
however, substantially different. It is the result of
interpretation of Marx and Lenin through the eyes of a
western Catholic/Protestant heritage rather than the
Byzantian perspective of the Russians. This renders it
fundamentally if only subtly different. Because of the
fundamental difference, it is in opposition to the Soviet
line. It is dangerous because its subtlety leads the
Soviets to fear that it may pass through the Iron Curtain by
osmosis. Because of this Soviet perception, they seek to
either split the Eurocommunist parties or to maintain
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control of them through official contact. Poland challenges
these wishes.
The 2urocommunists have adopted a position against
external intervention in Poland and they have made this
clear to the Soviets. Leading tham in this demarche has
been the Italian Communist Party (PCI). In early December,
1980, it released a statement which said "we regard military
intervention in Poland by the Warsaw Pact countries as a
very serious matter, entirely unacceptable to us." 156 In a
private letter to the leaders of the other European
Communist Parties, The PCI has warned of "irreparable
consequences" to the intercommunist relations if there is
intervention. Soviet displeasure with the PCI has reached
such a point that at a nesting of Carlo Pajetta of the PCI
and Vadim Zagladin, CPSO Foreign Affairs Chief, the Soviets
expressed "concern over a situation which they are trying to
get out of without breaks in relations taking place." The
most recent escalation occurred at the end of February when
the Soviets published a confidential letter from the CPSU
Central Committee addressed to Enrico Berlinguer, the head
of the PCI. In this letter, the Soviets accused him of
156 "poles Alone Must Resolve Their Problems,"




disloyalty. is7 <jhe Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has
announced that it would sever relations with the CPSU if the
feared armed intervention occurred. Future Soviet influence
in the major West European Communist Parties is gravely
challenged by the Polish events.
Another competing stake with which the Soviets must
contend is the threat to their own legitimacy which could
arise if a country under their tutelage, such as Poland,
were to remove itself from this position of subservience.
This possibility threatens both the expansionist tendencies
which have long been present in the Russian and Soviet
experience as well as the legitimacy of the current
government. Robert W. Tucker has recently written that the
Soviet leaders could not "assume that development leading to
the loss of their empire in Europe could be kept from
endangering the structure of power within the Soviet Onion
itself." lsa The close relationship of several of these
stakes is becoming evident. Ideological security, influence
in the Eurocommunist parties, and. legitimacy are tightly
bound and cannot be solved by the same single simple stroke.
»S7 Time, 2 March 1981, p. 40.
is* Robert 3. Tucker, "Trading Poland for the Sulf,"
!§£§/ April 1981, p. 18.
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The Soviets also have two physical security problems.
The first arises with their involvement in Afghanistan, but
this involvement seems limited in a relative sense. While
they will be forced to maintain forces there, the
psychological dimension of being tied down in that country
will be far more important than the military dimension.
Without denying the significant adversities which they are
facing in that country, they seem to be willing to accept
the status 3U0 in that country at least as long as other
important issues remain tabled. Tha Soviets second physical
security problem lies with China. Chinese military reaction
is certainly feared, but the potential improvement of
Chinese-US ties, including a major initiative to strengthen
the Chinese military with US assistance must be regarded as
a more realistic outcome and a significant development
because of the unappreciated Soviat sensitivity to the
Chinese.
One of the last competing stakes the Soviets have to
lose has already been highlighted, although in a different
manner. It has been argued that Soviet global strategy
includes driving a wedge between the QS and its West
European allies. In recent years, this wedge has become very
pronounced, as was evidenced by the discussion of the
11(*

selective detente. Soviet intervention in Poland would do
more to drive the Europeans back under the leadership of the
OS than anything else they could do, flnlike the quick
resumption of the SALT talks following the 1963 Soviet
intervention into Czechoslovakia, the effects of this move
today can be expected to last much longer.
E. SUHMARY
Surveying the discussion of the chapter so far, we see
that there are many important stakes involved. The Soviets
will be unable to gain one group without placing another
group in jeopardy. As the Soviets approach the decision in
Poland they are presented with many high stakes both for and
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Table 1 reflects the situation in late May, 198 1, and
must be read carefully. Conclusions drawn from a comparison
of short and long term reasons should be mixed very
carefully. The questions of party control seems to be one
key. A second key appears to be the balance which exists
between the arguments for and against intervention. Further
is* For discussions of spillover into Eastern Europe, see
pp. 103 and 175.
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In the pursuit of greater understanding of future Soviet
actions towards Poland, this analysis first looked at the
reality, as clearly as it is currently understood, of
Poland. It then traced the historical relationship of the
two countries to one another. In the last chapter, it asked
what , from the Soviet perspective, was put at risk by the
current state of affairs in Poland. However, before
projecting Soviet behaviour into the future, a fourth
dimension must be added to this analysis. This dimension
addresses soviet reaction to the current crisis. What has
been the nature of their interaction and response to this
crisis? What capabilities do they have with which they may
respond? What measures have the Soviets adopted thus far in
response to the crisis? Is there a trend in these
responses? l 60
i6o it is almost trite to note that Western understanding of
the soviet positions is extremely limited by the closed
nature of their system. In an unclassified survey, one is
therefore, left with a limited number of tools. These
include: detecting and recording significant events, such
as trips and grants; carefully weighing statements given by
Soviets in a variety of audiences; and reviewing Soviet news
reports, which are also made for a variety of audiences. A
final source are the statements and actions made by the East
Europeans themselves. This is a shaky foundation to use, but.
it is the oniy one available.
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A. POLAND REARS ITS TROUBLESOME HEAD
Strikes in Poland began on July 1, but it was not until
mid-August that the nature of these strikes becaie extremely
serious. soviet reaction revealed alarm and an
understandable sensitivity. More curious was their apparent
indecision; the press was silent until August 19 and no
meetings between Soviet officials and Westerners were
conducted during this period. Without clear direction of
their own, thay apparently decided to support Polish
government initiatives. While already accusing others of
attempting to use the situation for "revanchist" aims. One
American diplomat likened the Soviet response during this
period to a group of men "wringing their hands in
embarrassment.
"
The first action the Soviets took in response to the
crisis was the announcement on August 14, of the scheduled
dates for the Brotherhood-in-Ar'ms military exercise. While
this exercise was planned previously, its anouncement
necessarily took on political overtones. On the fifteenth,
the Soviets published a book of Gierek's works which
"detailed the socialist building of Poland." Not until the
nineteenth were the first work stoppages reported by Moscow.
On the following day, Russian language broadcasts of Voice
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of America, British Broadcasting Corporation, and Deutsche
Welle began to be jammed. 1 * 1 Soviet reporting became more
animated on August 25 when changes in the political
leadership of Poland occurred. On the next day, one Soviet
Foreign Ministry spokesman was forced into making the first
official Soviet statement. The Polish problems he said were
"purely an internal affair. ».•» The Soviet position was most
definitively given by Brezhnev in a speech on August 28. "We
shall always know how to stand up for our rights and
legitimate interests." 1 * 3 Limited use of the military
instrument during this time was probably due to the
practical impossibility of achieving a solution by its use
due to the widespread nature of the strikes, especially when
compounded by lack of time for thourough planning.
East European reactions throughout the period varied.
Yugoslavia and Hungary remained calm while Romania wondered
from whom the strikers wished to be "independent"; this may
have been a reflection of concern caused by strikes which
occurred in their own country on 15 and 18 August. The GDR,
tftt Ironically, not since the 1968 Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia had Deutsche Welle been jammed.
162 AFP (Paris), 26 August 1980, in F3IS-0SSR, 27 August
1980, p. F-1.
163 Moscow Domestic Service, 28 August 1980, in FBIS-DSSR, 2
September 1980, p. R-5.
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revealed its hardline perspective at the outset, already
speaking of the " international! stic iuty" of the East German
armed forces on August 24. 16 *
1
- 30 August - 6 September
The conclusion of the oldest strikes in the Northern
ports on 30 August allowed the Soviets to identify those who
were responsible. At one level, they seemed to blame anti-
socialist forces for inflicting what they called direct
damage to real socialism. On September 1, only two days
after signing of the Gdansk agreements, the semi-official
Alexei Petrov editorial in Pravda spoke to another level. He
identified further responsible parties. The editorial bore
some implicit criticism of the PUMP leadership while it
grudgingly accepted the solution they had arrived at, and
finally, it warned the leadership to limit further
concessions. 165 The most significant East European reaction
came from the GDR when Honecker cancelled a meeting with
Schmidt, without explanation, for a second time.
164 New York Times, 24 August 1980.





With the end of the month of August and the
conclusion of its dramatic events, the Poles sat down and
began to address the many recently promised reforms. It was
from this same period that sprang a three-pronged Soviet
program which has continued consistently since then. The
first element of this program provides for support of the
existing regime, the second seeks to influence the internal
developments in Poland, and the last seeks to isolate Poland
from its neighbors.
The Soviets demonstrated their support of the new
Polish regime when Polish Deputy Premier Jagielski flew to
Moscow for meetings on 12-14 September. His first major
accomplishment was to receive promises of economic support
in the form of food and limited amount of funds ($150
million) . While he was there, he also met with Suslov and
Brezhnev. It can be surmised that the Soviets were seeking
to find out what was happening in Poland from a Polish
leader while at the same time demonstrating their support
through the very fact that the meeting occurred.
The Soviets also sought to influence the events in
Poland and support the regime with the conduct of the
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Brother hood-in- Arms military axercisa. It began on September
9 and was continuing as late as September 20 and included
the largest manuevers in the WTO in the last tan years. In
many respects, these exercises were rehearsals for the
possibility of a later intervention. These Soviet attempts
were successful in displaying Scviat support for the regime,
but they were of only questionable- success in influencing
futura events within Poland as was witnessed by the
broadcast on September 2 1 of the first live Catholic
service
.
Moscow's perception of what was happening in Poland
was apparently bifurcated. On the one hand, there was the
perception of a return to normalcy. Brezhnev spoke at the
time of his confidence that the Poles would solve their
problems "within a short time." 166 On the other hand, the
Soviets also perceived great danger. KOR was attacked and
the imperialists, both internal and axternal to Poland, were
charged with impeding the return to normalcy. Can this
Soviet bifurcation be attributed to wishful thinking? In
the opinion of the author, it is not. It is more likely
that the conclusion of the strikes and the de facto and de
166 Moscow Domestic Service, 6 September 1980, in FBIS-OS Sa.
3 SEptember 1980, p. F-10.
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jare settlements with which the Soviets were not terribly
satisfied, allowed increased emphasis on other important
events in the international environment while it allowed a
less than totally satisfactory situation to continue in
Poland. The Soviet stake in Germany lent great importance
to the Germans elections, scheduled for October 4, and in
which a strong right wing candidate, Franz Josef Strauss,
was in the running. Nor should the US elections be
forgotten. To a somewhat smaller extent, the Madrid
conference may also have contributed to Soviet reticence to
intervene in Poland. Further evidence against the wishful
thinking argument is a comment by a Polish Central Committee
member. "fle know that some comrades in the Soviet Union do




The initial Soviet reaction which reflected a return
to normalcy began to take on an edgy quality towards the end
of September as soviet sensitivity over the qualities of the
emerging trade unions, which implicitly challenged the
Soviet system, became apparent. As the Poles prepared to
167 LlHH-t a « 10 September 1980, in Soviet World Outlook, 15
October T93o, p. 6.
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approve the first charters, the Soviets spoke in Pravda of
Lenin's views of trade unions. 168
While the Soviets adopted a moderate approach
towards the events in Poland at this early date, some of the
East Europeans continued with their strident line which had
started even in the midst of the strikes. Czechoslovakia
detained members of its Charter 77 dissident organization
and charged that antisocialist forces were hiding behind the
shield of necessary reform. They added that they could not
be indifferent to the events and stressed that they were
loyal allies. The GDR statements focused on "revanchist"
West Germany but the SDR also sent to Poland market
commodities with a value of $150 million above those called
for in the existing CMEA agreements. The Germans continued
to see dangerous signs. September was largely a month for
the world and the soviet bloc to catch its breath and to
consider the future.
2 . October
The quiet of September was marked at the beginning
of October by the registration of the first trade union.
The third prong in the soviet campaign, the isolation of
i«a »y # i m Lenin on the Trade Onions." Pravda (Moscow) , 28




Poland, now became evident. Polish newspapers were banned in
Lithuania in early October and portions of the Soviet-Polish
border were closed. The East Germans placed severe travel
restrictions on travelers crossing its border with Poland.
In this manner, much of Poland was sealed to international
travel.
The Soviet perception of the events in Poland and
their satisfaction, or lack thereof, of the unfolding events
was revealed in their domestic reports carrying the text of
Kania*s October U speech. These copies of his speech failed
to include his call for a redefinition of the
responsibilities and working relationships between the party
First Secretary and the government Premier. The theme of
the dichotomous thread continued and was perhaps became even
deeper. On the same day as Kania's speech, Georgi Arbatov,
Director of the USA Institute, was quoted as saying that he
saw the foundation of Poland being "solid and firm." 1 * 9
While this may only be a fluke which arose from the lack of
comprehension or poor communication, a statement made a week
later by Lt Gen Lushnichenko, head of the Political Command
169 Mew York Times, 5 October 1980, p. E-3
126

of the Northern Group of Soviet Armed Forces, revealed a
similar estimate of the situation existing in Poland. 170 He
did not, of course, fail to add that the Northern Group of
forces were well aware of the complicated character of the
present times and of the weight and responsibility for the
tasks involved in defending the Western approaches of the
community. During October, military units were reported to
be moving around Poland.
Many of the events related above occurred early in
the month. As the month progressed, tensions had been
growing. On 20 October, Gromyko made a trip to Warsaw. Two
days after his unannounced visit the charter for Solidarity
was approved after much wrangling within Poland. This could
not have occurred without some kind of tacit support or
approval from the Soviets. The month of October closed on
the thirtieth with a delegation of high ranking Poles
visiting Moscow. '
While the Soviets saw both normalcy and danger, the
East. European hard-liners did not. Czechoslovakia saw
"counter-revolution" already underway and the GDR, whose
attentions had lately been directed more towards the FRG,
i7o "Meetings, Speeches Mark Army Day Celebrations,"
Zolnierz Wolnosci (Warsaw) , 11-12 October 1980, p. 2, in
?E!3r22IJ,~ZT~nc?ober 1980, p. G-17.
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redirected their attention to Poland. They called the
existing situation "most serious" and volunteered that
"friends ensure socialism." 171 Moderate Hungary began
showing expected signs of sensitivity over its own reforms.
In an article on the Hungarian economic model, words and
phrases like "methods" and "reply to reality" were
substituted for "model" in an attempt to avoid drawing
excessive Soviet attention. t72
In October, rising tensions caused the Soviet
program of support for the regime, influencing the internal
developments and isolating Poland met with mixed results.
Attempts to influence internal developments were clearly
overridden by the approval of solidarity's charter on 22
October and the aforementioned gain by reformers in the
Polish leadership.
3 . November
During November the Soviets made the largest
commitment yet in support of the Polish regime with a $1 . 1
billion loan to them. Efforts to physically isolate the
Polish contagion were completed on November 13 when
i7i ADN (East Berlin), 30 October 1980, in FBIS-EEU, 31
October 1980, P. E-2, and ADN(East Berlin) , 13 JctoTer 1980,
in Z3IS-EEU, 15 October 1980, p. E-5.
t72 "Vienna Die Presse Interviews MSZMP Ideologist Aczel,"




Czechoslovakia placed stringent new restrictions on travel
across the border of the two countries. Soviet perceptions
of the events in Poland shifted during mid-November. This
shift was foreshadowed by Romanian President Nicholai
Ceascesc^s 4 November comments in which he argued that the
time for appropriate action had been missed. 173 The implicit
criticism of the USSR was perceived by them and evidenced in
their failure to rebroadcast this portion of his speech.
From the middle of November, events begin an exponential
climb in both their quality and quantity. On November 12,
Paris Match, a French magazine, published a poll of 510
Poles.* 7 * In this poll they found that 66% of the Poles were
willing to fight for Polish independence while only 3%, the
stalwart members of the Communist Party, supported the
existing regime. A period of three to four weeks of tension
started concurrently with the publication of this poll.
Soviet statements during the latter portion of the month
revealed a subtle shift in their perceptions. While the
Poles were still portrayed supporting the system, there was
* 7:» "Kremlin Observes Discretion at Present Stage of Polish
Crisis." Le Monde {Paris) , u November 1980, p. 10, in FBIS-
USSR, 6 November" 19 80, p. F-2.
174 Christian Science Monitor, 14 November 1980.
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no longer evidence that the system was returning to a state
of normalcy.
Soviet propaganda was sorely challenged by this poll
but it persisted on its original track. Leonid Zamyatin, a
member of the Supreme Soviet* s Foreign Affairs Committee,
disputed the poll in a TV interview given in the 0SS3 on the
fifteenth.
i
7 s other analysts have interpreted this interview
to be tough. Zamyatin noted anti-socialist ties of a few
with the West and argued that a majority continued to
support the system. However, in another interview conducted
two weeks later, this so-called tough stance was moderated
by his additional acknowledgement that the situation in
Poland was complicated. 176 Events in Poland continued to
accelerate. The Polish secret police raid on trade union
quarters which found state secrets occurred on November 21.
On the 22, an avowed Catholic was elevated to the position
of Deputy Premier and on 25 November a strike occurred in a
tractor factory. Two days later a national strike alert was
called.
1" TASS (Moscow) . "Studio Nine." 15 November 1930, in JJIS-
USSR, 17 November 1980, p. CC-8.
17 * Prague Domestic TV Service. 27 November 1993, in ?3IS-
USSR, 1 December 1980, p. CC-11.
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As these events occurred. East European comment
became more acerbic. Czechoslovakia continued to paint a
picture of the imminent loss of Poland to the West.
Conditional credit assistance offered by the West was
"blatant interference."* 77 Finally, Solidarity was an
opposition force which caused a "feverish state and
threatened the "destruction of the entire social
organism." 178 By the end of November, they were noting
deliberate acts of sabotage at factories and other signs of
collapse. Czechoslovak anxiety was echoed by the GDR
.
Walesa was a "rabid" person holding :, anti-communist
views." 179 They went so far as to quote the Czech report on
the destruction of the social organism. In contrast,
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Hungary remained much calmer. In
one of the more incisive analyses, Yugoslav writers noted at
aid-month that the polish historical compromise might not be
aimed at overthrowing the system. 180
177 «£ Note: What They Are Aiming at," Rude Pravo ( Prague)
,
19 November 1980, p. 7, in FBIS^EEU, 24 TJcvem&ef"1980 , p.
D-1.
178 "State Power Weakening," Rude Pravo (Prague) , 23 November
1980, p. 7, in F3IS-EE0, 2 DecemEef~T950 , p. D-1.
179 "informative Confessions in an FRG Illustrated
Magazine, " Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 22-23 November
1930, p . 5
.
~rn"F3Ig^S2TT7~25""Nov embe r 1980, p. E-1.
leo "Sartinovic Says Polish Solidarity •Testino 1 Its
Authority," Borba (Zagreb) , 14 November 1980, o. 7, in FBIS^
220, 20 Sovem5ef"T9 80, p. 1-1.
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Soviet and Warsaw Pact preparations had continued
since the Brother hood-;.n-Arms exercise held in September bat
now in November, increased activity was noted. A temporary
restricted area (ISA) was proclaimed in the GDR across a
fourty kilometer area for the period 29 November - 9
December. These military preparations were accompanied by
attempts to preclude what was considered to be an otherwise
inevitable event. News of inter-training with Polish
military units was carried in Krasnaya Zvezda, the Soviet
military daily, on 29 November. The moderate reactions of
September and October became clouded and revealed great
sensitivity in November.
*• 1 Decision to Intervene: XJae first Iteration
The events of the first week of December were
surrounded in a cloud of confusion. Study of these events
renders valuable insight into the Soviet Politburo and the
role of the Soviet Onion in the Eastern Bloc. Late in
November, the Soviets appear to have made a decision to
intervene. Signs of active planning became evident only
during this period. This lata November decision to
intervene is reflected in a variety of ways. On 29 November
Senator Charles Percy was closely questioned by 3rezhnev,
Suslov, and GromyJco while on a trip to the Soviet Onion. The
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attention displayed in and by these conversations leaves one
with the view that more than the new OS President was on the
minds of the soviet leaders. Did the Soviets, hope through
these discussions, to glean information about official
American attitudes towards Soviet intervention? On November
25, the Soviets made their first statements which noted
concern over the security and national interests affected by
the upcoming nationwide Polish strides. 181 Between 25 and 30
November, commentaries coming forth remained mixed. GiereJc
made a curious visit to the Soviet anion between 28 November
and 5 December. 182
By the thirtieth, Soviet media had stabilized on a
line that seemed to indicate preparation of the Soviet
populace for an intervention. Radio Moscow noted that broad
circles of Polish society were concerned about the crisis in
Poland and quoted the Polish press in saying that the Polish
authorities had in the past few days been receiving
resolutions and decisions from social organizations and
trade union groups expressing deep concern about the current
situation. 183 On November 30, Vilnius, the capital of
181 Radio Liberty 455/80, 2 December 1980, p. 1.
192 "Alarmist Tone in Warsaw-" Le Monde f Paris) , 5 December
1930, pp., 1,3, in PBIS^EEO, 5 Decam5ef~7980, p. G-4.
183 Radio Liberty 456/80, 30 November 1980, p. 7.
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Lithuania was unexpectedly closed to foreign visitors. On
December 2, the entire SDR-Polish border was closed. Oa 3
December, the GDH mobilization was confirmed by both Bonn
and Washington. On that same day, Soviet forces in position
around Poland went on alert. Other indications of a high
state of military preparedness included the forward
relocation of command posts, the stockpiling of ammunition
and fuel, the establishment of mobile field hospitals, and
the callup of reserves. 184
There is further evidence that this decision had
been only recently taken. The Soviets rely on gold sales to
provide a major source of their hard currency, but as late
as October, they were still engaged in heavy gold
trading. l8S Because gold habitually increases in value after
events such as the one under discussion, it would have been
logical for them to hold up these sales if intervention had
been a under serious consideration only a short time
earlier. These gold sales had only recommenced, after an
absence of a year, in September. 18 *
184 Washing ton Star, 18 December 1980.
iaa «Big Soviet Sold Transfer to Zurich," Financial Times,
20 November 1980, ?. 2, in FBIS-ttSSR, 15 SecemT55r^933,
Annex.
ia6 jhe Soviets evidenced a sharp market .sense previously
when they bought unusually high quantities of cobalt




A second piece of evidence supporting the short-term
nature of this decision comes from the change of command of
two senior Soviet commanders in the Warsaw Pact. The
commanders of both the Central Group of Forces in
Czechoslovakia and of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany
were rotated between the third and the fifth of December.
These rotations could easily have been postponed if
intervention had been considered more probable only a short
time earlier, before the plans for their rotations were
widespread knowledge. That they occurred may be explained by
Soviet confidence or deception. Neither of these arguments
are strong by themselves.
Another explanation for their replacement can also
be made. It arises from the dates of their rotations. This
author believes that between 3 and 5 December, the Soviets
may have been persuaded not to intervene. Reports emerging
since that time have indicated that Hungary and P.omania
pressured the USSR into a postponement of the 7erdict at the
December 5 meeting, 187 but the decision was more likely
taken prior to the ieeting T It has been reported that
President Ceauscescu did not decide to attend the conference
i 87 "Warsaw Pact Will Decide in Moscow How to •Restore
Order'," Corriere Delia Seca(Milan), 4 February 1981, p. 4.
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until after Brezhnev assured him that he would not be
present; at a meeting which would ratify the intervention
which Ceauscescu opposed, 18 ' Other evidence is also present
to support the contention that the 5 December meeting was
not set to ratify intervention. One is the fact that the
Poles were also in attendance at the latter meeting. Had a
decision to intervene been anticipated, it is nighiy
unlikely that they would have been in attendence.
The East European leaders were able to influence and
reverse the Soviet decision because of a deeper division
within the Soviet Politburo itself. It has been reported
that very influential members of the Politburo were lined up
against the principle advocate of intervention, Defense
Minister Dmitriy Ustinov. According to his report, Brezhnev
did not take sides and no agreement was reached. 189
There is further support for the contention that the
5 December meeting in fact ratified a decision for non-
intervention. The careful wording and the even more careful
requoting by all major East European sources of the 5
las "Romania's 'Moderating Role 1 at Summit Noted," Le
Monde (Paris) . 9 December 1980, p. 3, in FBJs^asSR, TT
December 1980, p. BB-1. It should be noted tKa€ a normally
scheduled Ministers meetinq of the WTO had been conducte
duriag the period 1-3 December in Romania and that this 5
December meeting in Moscow was very impromptu.
189 Was hington Star, 30 December 1980.
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December Warsaw Pact communique is remarkable. This
communique said in part that the participants
expressed their conviction that Poland's communists,
working class and working people would be able to master
the existing difficulties and problems and to secure the
future development of their country towards socialism.
(They) also reaffirmed that socialist Poland, the Polish
United Workers Party, and the Polish people lay rely on
the fraternal assistance of the member-countries of the
Warsaw alliance.
That the decision was taken within the Soviet Union prior to
the meeting may also have been evidenced by a December 5
article published in the morning edition of Pravda, fully
two days after the Polish Plenum. It noted that decisions
taken at the plenum would "promote a peaceful
atmosphere. "»90 This is a major change in tone from the 30
November Radio Moscow report related above.
Evidence that the decision of the fifth was for non-
intervention also came out in negative fashions. On the
seventh. East German officials were reporting that a number
of railroad trains carrying meat from Germany to Poland had
been diverted by "rebel" Polish workers. 191 The tone of this
report gives it the appearance of an attempt to lobby for a
decison to intervene. This is implicit evidence that the
190 "Fraternal Newspapers: At the Center of Attention,"
Pravda (Moscow) , 5 December 1980, p. 5, in ?BIS-USS3, 9
December 1980, p. F-1.
191 £ashi3.tqn Star, 7 December 1980.
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decision had not yet been taken. Also on the seventh, the
Washington Star quoted "a faithful and precise" informant
inside the GDR who noted that a military move into Poland
would occur within four weeks if_ the Polish leadership
failed to restore its authority. 192
Unlike the Germans, who on December 7 appeared to be
lobbying for a reversal of a decision for non-intervention,
on the evening of 5 December, the Czechs broadcast an radio
editorial which said that "there do not exist problems that
cannot be solved by political means." 193 As can be expected,
this contrasted with the alarmist reports the Czechoslovak
press had published during the entire preceding crisis
period.
In review, this author feels that several decisions
were taken. The first was taken by the Soviets in the last
week of November and called for a quick intervention.
Certain East Europeans determined that this decision had
been made and, capitalizing on a weak Soviet consensus
within the soviet Politburo, caused it to be "reversed
between 3 and 5 December. This reversal was accepted by the
192 ibid,
193 Prague Domestic Service, 5 December 1980, in F BIS-EEU , 8
December 1980, p. AA-2.
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Soviets before the Warsaw Pact meeting and ratified at the
meeting.
5. A Decision to Intervene: & Second, Iteration
December 6 r as has been noted, marks a sudden shift
in the signs and signals which the Soviets were sending. On
that day, both Krasnaya Z vezda the soviet military daily,
and pravda revealed a significantly new tone. The military
journal reported that the OSSR-Polish relations were noted
by "good neighborliness" and the Moscow radio report on the
Polish plenum was unemotive in the manner in which it spoke
of the constructive nature of Kania*s efforts. 1 **
But two pieces of good evidence indicate that the 5
December decision did not stand for long. The first comes
from a London times article which reported the release of
Swedish intelligence from the December time period. 195 7he
report maintains that on December 6, an unusual amount of
Soviet military shipping was observed in the Baltic. Between
7 and 9 December, three divisions were moved from garrison
locations to tents in the vicinity of Kaliningrad and that
i«* "Foreign Publicist in Krasnaya Zvyezda: Our Close Combat
Alliance," Krasnaya Zyyezdatloscow) 7 0"December 1980, p. 3,
in FBISj-jtesR7^HFecemDer""T9"80, p. F-3, and Moscow Domestic
Service," " 6~IJecember 1980, in FBIS-asSR, 8 December 1980, p.
F-3.
195 "swedes Surprised that West Did Not Notice Worst Threat
to Poland," The Times (London) , 6 April 1981, p. 4.
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during that time a direct radio communications link was set
u? with Hoscow. This report is corraborated by 3r zezinski'
s
statement that the US learned on December 7 of an impending
movement of a Soviet airborne division into Poland. 196
Brzezinski added that in response to this knowledge,
President Carter sent a stern message to Brezhnev and the
Times report noted a sudden halt of preparations on 9
December.
This seems to offer indisputable evidence that the
Soviets were planning for intervention sometime after the
fifth. Did this reflect one decision which was never
altered, one which was never taken, or, as argued, two
decisions which were both cancelled. The evidence is not
clear. Jiri Valenta argued that the Soviet decision to move
into Czechoslovakia was taken only three days before the
operation. 197 This further supports the argument that two
decisions were taken. History makes it clear that both were
cancelled. Regardless of which interpretation is favored,
the perspective that one gains of the Soviet Politburo
during this time is one of weakness and indecisiDn. This is
196 San Francisco Chronicle , 2 February 1931
140

the same indecision that was noted during the August strikes
and is important to the future analysis. It clearly
indicates that the Warsaw Pact collectivity and the Soviet
Politburo was giving the Poles the chance to solve their own
problem again. Certainly, a variety of military actions
taken during this period serve to induce firmer actions on
the Polish communists and may have intimidated the Polish
workers for a period of time.
C. SINTER 1980-198 1
1 . December
The Soviet attitudes during the balance of December
are distinct from those of the preceeding two weeks and are
subject to less interpretation. Between 11 and 20 December,
there were numerous attempts to calm the international
environment. Most of this calming was accomplished through
interviews of ranking Soviet officials conducted in the
Best. On the eleventh, Vadim Zagladin gave an interview in
Rome and Soviet Ambassador K. Chervonenko gave one in
France. On December 14, Boris Ponomarev, Central Committee
secretary overseeing the International Department, gave
another one in France followed on the fifteenth by Soviet
Ambassador Valentin Fali^s in the FRG. The final one was
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granted by Zamyatin in Helsinki on the 20. In each of these,
the same theme was apparent. The Soviet Union was supporting
the Polish solution to the Polish problem.
During this period there was a resurgence in the
economic support of the CMEA to Poland. On December 16,
Soviet radio quoted the Polish newspaper Tribuna Ludu, when
it noted that all the CMEA countries had announced a speedup
of trade deliveries to Poland. '« a Starting on the December
12, Soviet reports noted the return of rhythm to the Polish
srforkpiace. * •• This new attitude was clear by 25 December
when the Moscow World Service noted that "commonsense,
constructive attitudes and realism are gradually gaining the
upper hand in Poland." 200 Similar to their September
reactions was the reemergence at this time of discussions of
competing stakes in their propaganda. This was lost notable
in the Soviet attempts to split the US from its allies. It
came at the same time that the OS was attempting to provide
leadership to its allies in the event of possible Soviet
intervention. Attacks accused the as of being responsible
199 Moscow World Service, 16 December 1980, in F3IS-0SSH, 17
December 1980, p. P-2.
»** Moscow Domestic Service, 12 December 1980, in FBIS-US53,
12 December 1980, p. F-U.
200 Moscow World Service, 25 December 1980, in FBIS^USSR, 29
December 1980, p. P-5.
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for "whipping up an attitude of hysteria and noted that the
reasons for the disturbance in Poland were all due to
western generated agitation. 201
Finally, Soviet attitudes in thi^s period included an
acceptance of the Polish situation . The Soviets seem to
have erased their old line and redrawn it to include
Solidarity. Zagladin gave evidence to this view when he
wrote that the Soviet Onion "denies that Solidarity deviates
from the socialist system." This may hav^ been due in part
to another growing Soviet perception also confirmed by
Leonid Zamyatin. The Soviets understood that "the economic
and social problems now affecting Poland could hit any other
country." 202 Implicit in this understanding is recognition
that the Soviets do not have the military forces sufficient
to garrison the whole of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. Perhaps they are being forced to recognize that some
reform is an absolute necessity.
Soviet attitudes during the balance of December
reflected a reversal away from the increasing tension levels
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which started in September, continued through October and
accelerated through November into early December. The
changeover did not occur uniformly throughout the decision-
making hierarchy. On December 10, Ustinov called for a
raising of vigilance against the aspirations of imperialist
forces. 2<> 3 Coming immediately before the 11-20 December
international campaign related above, and after the sudden
halt of preparations on 9 December, it appears to give
evidence to the fact that the Soviet military was indeed a
proponent of intervention and was slow in accepting the
political decision ratified at the Warsaw Pact meeting.
A second military occurrence after the fifth, was
the continued staffing of the Polish armed forces by Soviet
officers including those in the Ministry of Defense. Some of
these officers wore Polish military uniforms in an effort to
maintain a low profile and in some respects, this was a
subtle but sure form of intervention. 204 Another unique and
new quality was the announcement during this period of a
203 TASS International Service(Moscow) , 10 December 1980, in
fBlS-OSSR, 11 December 19 80, p. V-1
.
20* "Soviet 'Advisors* with Polish Army Reported," Valeurs
Actuelles (Paris) , 29 December 1980, p. 10, in FaiS^E^TT^ T3
January 193 1, Annex.
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military exercise which never occurred, or occurred only in
a much smaller scale than reported. 205
December was noted by a Soviet reacceptance of the
Solidarity trade union in particular and the Polish
situation in general, a willingness to find a new solution
originally not of their liking, and giving some evidence of
bureaucratic politics within the Soviet decision making
hierarchy, more specifically, of the lack of concensus
within the Politburo.
2. Januar y
In Poland, the peace of December was followed, in
January, by a dispute over the implementation of the
provision of work on Saturdays. This dispute was the center
of Soviet comment during the month, but the Soviets
continued to support Poland. Deputy Premier Jagielski went
to Moscow to celebrate the new year by receiving a $465
million package of assistance from the Soviets and Brezhnev
made a statement in which he expressed hope that the task to
overcome the present difficulties would be fulfilled under
the leadership of the POWP.
2os Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report/304, 18
December 1980, p. 3.
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Other January themes were not as positive, however.
Against the increasing rhythm and heightened activities
noted at the end of December and the beginning of January
there was a growing threat of counterrevolution. The
expressions "healthy forces," and "anti-socialist forces
against the state" were used with increasing regularity. 206
At the beginning of January, reports on Solidarity carefully
drew the distinction between it and the anti-socialist
forces who used it as a cover. 207 However, the trade union's
strong advocacy of Saturday work recast it in the Soviet
minds into the chief perpetrator of the aggravation. In
fact, the bid to aggravate this situation proved to the
Soviets, as they said, that Solidarity was not part of the
solution. 208
Soviet concern was evidenced when Marshall Victor G.
Kulikov, the Soviet WTO Commander, made a surprise visit to
Warsaw on January 13. Following his meeting with Kania, he
dropped out of sight leading to speculation that he was
conferring with military leaders. San. Anotoly I. Gribkov,
206 "3ajalski Reports Soviet Reaction to Polish Events,"
PolitikaYBelgradeJ, 9 January 1981, p. 1-2, in FBIS-EEU, 13
January i981, p. I- 1
.
207 «»Pro vocative Demands." TASS (Moscow) , 1 January 1981, in
FBIS-assR, 2 January 1931, p. F-1.
2 °» Moscow World Service, 2 3 January 1981.
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Chief of Staff of the WTO, and Gen. Afanasi F. Schleglov,
commander of Soviet forces in Western Poland, were seen in
public with him during his visit.
Finally, Western interference continued to be a
theme of Soviet propoganda. It may have reflected the
Soviets true perceptions. Articles referred to work done by
Brzezinski during the 1960* s as a long-term plan being used
by the JS to undermine Soviet strength in the Eastern
Bloc. 209 The OS was not the only country in the West
responsible for interfering in Polish affairs. The British
were also targeted for their complicity in helping an emigre
organization in London.
The East European press was different from the
Soviet press only in that it continued to be more vitriolic.
The Czechs continued to be extremely negative while the SDR
chose to remind the Poles of the debt they had to the
Soviets whose troops had liberated their country at the end
of WWII. Conversely, Yugoslavia maintained its much more
rational and cautious approach while noting that Polish
party members were exressing concern over the continuing
tension in Poland.
20* aoscow, shortwave to Hungary, 3 January 1981, in F3IS-




Soviet military operations showed some decrease in
the readiness, but Soviet military preparedness continued to
be evidenced by better shelter for the troops, a staff
exercise with the Hungarians, and another small exercise
which was given publicity much in excess of its size. Gen.
A. A. Yepishev, the chief of the Main Political Directorate
for the Soviet armed forces, was quoted on January 16 as
saying that reationary imperialist circles were trying to
disrupt the prevailing balance of power within Poland. 210
In January, the Soviets became disturbed with the
new line of tolerance which they had made in December and
which had included Solidarity. Their magnanimity of December
could only continue in a period of polish social peace.
ahen this started slipping during the month, their tolerance
also slipped. The end of January found the Soviets
increasingly concerned, Bast Europe continuing to attack,
and bureaucratic political advocates of firmness now making
public speeches.
3 . ?ebruary
February opened to a serious situation. The Soviets
had the constraint of 26th Party Congress, scheduled for
210 "Taking the Lead and Showing Leadership: Party
Conferences," Krasnaya Zvy,ezda (Moscow) , 16 January 1981, p.
2# in £2IS^ass£,~Z6* January~T98 1 , p. BB-4.
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February 26 , with which to concern themselves and yet Poland
was experiencing serious social disruptions as Solidarity
protested against slow enactment of the Gdansk agreements.
The GDR clamored about falling Polish exports disturbing the
CM2A production plans. The Czechs were emphasizing the hea7y
handed ways of solidarity and quoting Poles who wrote that
the situation was deteriorating.
The Soviets maintained twenty six divisions on alert
status around Poland and on the ninth, sent a clear message
that their patience was not infinite when the Soviet
Ambassador to East Germany, Petr Abrasimov, warned that the
USSR could not remain indifferent to the current events
which included observations that dual power was becoming a
reality in Poland. Soviet dissatisfaction was also
displayed in their much delayed first use of a Polish
government document published on November 25 which detailed
the role of the centers of foreign subversion who are
"carrying out psychological warfare "against socialist
countries. 211 A Literaturna ya Sazeta article also portrayed




the Western interference in Poland* s extreme difficulties in
very base terms. 212 TASS properly summarized the Soviet
fears in this regard by noting that "counter rsvolutionary
forces are actually starting a frontal attack on party." 213
The situation in Poland took on a naw hue with
Kania's appointment of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski as the new
Premier on 12 February. soviet acquiescence but not firm
support greeted his appointment, however, Soviet attitudes
once again siezed on the hope that the Polish situation was
not yet out of control. Solidarity's ratification of
Jaruzelski 's call for a three month moratorium on strikes
gave them some reason for their positive attitudes.
East European activities were not in full unison.
On the fourteenth, the Bulgarians offered fraternal support
and international assistance. 214 Czechoslovakia spoke of
Poland as a "Trojan horse," 215 and the GDR continued its its
strong rhetoric. It was "horrified" at the "yielding
2 * 2 "Behind the Mask of •Solidarity'," Literaturnaya
Gazveta (Moscow) , 11 February 19 81, p. 9,14, in EIIJE21SI7 '
»
FeBruary 1981, p. F-7.
2t3 TASS (Moscow) , 6 February 1981, in FBIS-US3R, 9 February
1981, p. F-1.
2l * "International Weekly Reyiew; Appeals for Calm and
Resolute struggle against Antisocialist Forces in Poland."
Marodna Ar aiyatsofia) , 14 February 1981, p. 3, in F BIS-EEU,
l9"~?e5fuafy~T981, p. C~9.
21S "Against Poland's Enemies," Zemedelske Nqvinyf Prague )
,




attitudes of the Polish authorities." 216 On February 13,
they demonstrated their dissatisfaction by practicing river
crossings on the Neisse River at the Polish border. Kania
made trips in late February to reassure Gustav Husak (CZ) and
Erich Honecker (GDR) and to gain the time he needed to
reestablish firm control over Poland.
*• March
March started quietly as Polish workers returned to
their jobs. Again, the Soviets noted that industrial
production was gradually returning to normal. On March 6,
Soviet leaders expressed confidence that "the Polish
communists have every opportunity and are strong enough to
eliminate the dangers to their socialist gains." On March
12, the Soviets were still reporting that the situation in
Poland was normalizing. They went on to add that it would
take years of intensive work to rebuild Poland. The Soviets
also seemed to again view Solidarity, in its basic nature,
as an acceptable feature in a communist system. Through
mid-March, the soviet concern sprang from the long-term
significance of the Polish events. Poland was quiet enough




that no discussion of it was included in the Soviet TV news
shows of mid-March.
5. Soyuz 31
But against the background of these statements were
the upcoming Soyuz 81 military exercises. A large meeting
of military commanders of the GDR and USSR took place in
Moscow between the 5 and the 8th. 2 l7 Senior officials in
attendance were Ustinov, Yepishev, Kulikov, and Marshal
Ogarkov from the USSR and Gen. Heinz Hoffmann and Col Gen
Heinz Kessler from the SDR. The Soyuz exercises were
announced on 10 March. They were planned as a "joint
headquarters exercise of the allied armies and air forces"
and "sought to improve coordination and work out questions
of cooperation betwen the superior headquarters of the
fraternal countries." 218
The relative calm of early March was shattered two
days after the exercises started when protesting farmers
were beaten in the town of Bydgoszcz on 19 March. The
tension this produced lead directly to another serious
military scare. Soyuz 81, announced as largely command and
217 "Friendly Meeting," Krasnava Zvyezda {Moscow} , 6 March
1981, p. 1, in F3ISz 0SSR,"TT~Harch""TsrHT7"p. F-2.
2n Moscow Domestic Service, 10 March 1981, in FBI S-OSS R, 11
March 1981, p. BB-1.
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staff exercises, in fact, took on the appearance of a dress
rehearsal for a future intervention. Between 17 Karch and 7
April, a wide variety of manuevers were held. East German
forces conducted advances to contact which closely matched
their anticipated future actions. 3y both day and night,
they advanced fourty kilometers, including making a water
obstacle crossing (100 meters) , and then met an enemy who
offered stiff resistance. 219 In other exercises, Polish and
East German seaborne forces simulated landings on the
Baltic. 220 Some were conducted in the vicinity of Talinn 221
and may have served the dual purpose of demonstrating Soviet
resolve to the restless Estonians. (See preceding chapter)
The serious nature of the military exercises were
evidenced by the highest military alert called since World
War II in Sweden. 222 BBC carried a report on 27 aarch of a
West European intelligence report which claimed that the
Soviets had decided in the last several days to intervene.
The option was clearly available. A breach of protocol
caused the Soviet Warsaw Pact commander, Kulikov, to be
219 ADN(East Berlin), 1 April 1981, in PBIS-EEU, 3 April
1931, p. AA-1.
220 Christ ian Science Monitor, 31 March 1981.
221 Times (London) , 6 April 1981, p. 4.
222 Christian Science Monitor* 2U March 1981.
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named exercise commander. On previous occasions, the
commander has come from the host country, in this case, East
Germany. 223 The Soyuz 81 exercises failed to be halted at
their expected time. The exercises ran an additional week
and even after the Soviet announcement of their successful
conclusion, the activities tapered off only very slowly.
6. April
The end of March witnessed Solidarity calling a
nationwide strike for April 1 in protest over the events an
and subsequent to Bydgoszcz. April came early, on the
thirtieth of March when Solidarity called off this strike
because of the certainty of bloodshed. Later, a Solidarity
spokesman was quoted saying that they had heard of a rumor
to close the Warsaw airport and had learned that reservists
had been recalled to their barracks and that the Polish
Transport Company, PKS, had been ordered to prepare buses
for what could only have been troop movement. This threat
came from the manuevering troops. 224 The cancellation of the
strike seemed, though only slowly, to take the wind from the
sails driving the Soviet ship towards intervention.
223 Hew York Times, 27 March 1981.
22* "Warsaw Threatened a State of Sieqej." De






Other soviet statements from this early April period
gave indication to the serious state of affairs. One Pole
was quoted saying, "morally, Fascism stands higher that
Marxism. 22s Another "Polish" listener "wrote" to a Moscow
radio network. "The socialist order must be reestablished
quickly if we want to defend our fatherland and
socialism." 226 Finally, lz_Z§stia noted that events have
recently "proven that the 'creeping counterrevolution 1 has
risen to its feet and attained its full height." 227
On April 5, Brezhnev made a surprise visit to
Czechoslovakia to attend their communist party aseting. His
speech was moderate in tone, but it contained a subtle shift
in attitude. Of Poland, he said in part, "Poland's genuine
patriots will be able, one should suppose. to give a
necessary rebuff to the schemes of the enemies of the
socialist system."228 The "conviction" of December's Warsaw
Pact communique gave way to " one should suppose" in April.
But while the certainty of a Polish solution was diminished,
228 "Anti-Socialist Assemblage." Pravda (Moscow) , 2 April
1981, p. 5, in FBIS^OSSR, 3 April 1?8T7"p. F-1.
22 * Moscow, in French, 5 April 1981, in FBIS-dSSR, 6 April
1981, p. F-10.
227 "What Next?," Izvestia, 5 April 1981, in FBIS-qsSR, 6
April 1981, p. F-77
22a Moscow Domestic Service, 7 April 198 1, in F3I S-USS R, 7
April 1981, p. F-1. Emphasis added.
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the speech was viewed as moderate in view of the fact that
the Soyuz 81 in an ue vers, which possessed such serious
potential, were continuing a week beyond their scheduled
conclusion.
While the highest level Soviet statements were
showing subtle shifts, changes in East Europe were much more
pronounced. In early April, T. Zhivkov, the Bulgarian
Communist Party First secretary, expressed Bulgaria's
"fraternal solidarity with all true Polish patriots." 229 For
the first time, the Hungarians, the only East European
country with a history of friendly relations with Poland,
strongly criticized Solidarity and echoed their East German
and Czech counterparts. 230
In mid-April, following the conclusion of Soyuz-81
,
the Soviets were acknowledged to be capable of moving
120,000 men, eight divisions, into Poland within a few
hours. They were openly regarded to be capable of commiting
an additional 100,000 troops, seven divisions, into Poland
within one week. 231 But the tone of their statements again
229 "Further Reportage on 12th Bulgarian CP Congress,"
Pravda (Moscow) , 1 April 1981, p. %, in FBIS^GS_S_R, 6 April
lT3T7~p. F-13.
230 gepszabadsag* in Christian Science Monitor, 2U April
1981.
231 iiaisweejs, 13 April 1981, p. 62.
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quieted as April passed and they could be clearly viewed as
loosing in their war of nerves with the Poles. It has
become apparent that the Soviets gave the Poles a new lease
on life in April.
Reviewing the past several months, what trends can be
seen? The Soviets have used three threats to keep East
Europe in line since WWII. 232 These threats have been
political, economic, and military. The military threat is
clear, but its success has been less so. Two exercises have
been held within Poland. During the last exercise, the Poles
held a nationwide U-hour strike. This leads one to question
the capability of this threat to gain any important goals
for the Soviets. The Soviet economic threat towards Poland
has routinely been, instead, an inducement. When the
Soviets have had problems with the Poles in the past, they
have extended aid. This pattern has been used frequently
since August in this crisis. If the Soviets consider
intervention to be inevitable, one might expect them to
refrain from extending it much as they did in Czechoslovakia
in 1968. But Soviet economic support appears to continue
through today. Political threats have also had varying
232 Korbonski, "Eastern Europe and the Soviet Threat,"





success. Political threats include ideological warnings,
official visits, and statements. In Poland today, they have
failed to prevent the workers contagion from spreading to
the party. Thus it is evident that the standard methods of
control available to the Soviets have been well exercised
and, in the final analysis, have failed.
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IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTORE
Observers of the present situation in Poland are today
presented with a great challenge. No one would dispute that
the events in Poland have far exceeded other Eastern Bloc
disturbances since World War II and yet, no intervention has
occurred. In the absence of a key to future Soviet
reactions, what threads have we uncovered which give light
to the future events?
A. REVIEW
It appears clear that the events transpiring in Poland
will continue. The transformations of the power
relationships inside Poland give little evidence of a
tendency to return to the s tat us jug a.nte in the short-term.
The pattern of change has maintained its direction and
increased in its forcefulness despite strong reactions from
the Soviets and their Eastern European neighbors.
Ratification of reform proposals which must undoubtedly
occur during the July POWP Congress will substantially
bolster these new patterns of relationships. Thus, it is
unlikely that the problems in Poland will disappear soon.
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The historical survey also makes it clsar that the
Soviets have a predisposition to intervene founded on years
of history and numerous precedents dating to the mid-
seventeenth century. Their historical claim to Poland is
equally supported, according to their world view, by the
cost they bore during the Great Patriotic War (World War II)
whose end saw them in control of Poland. No events have yet
occurred to lessen any of these claims. Finally, the
discussion of the Soviet stakes in Poland makes it clear
that the changes occurring there are both serious and
diametrically opposed to Soviet desires.
Future Soviet actions in Poland will largely be
determined by the events unfolding in Poland, itself. Both
the soviet stakes in Poland, and the costs implicit with
Soviet intervention are extremely high while the competing
stakes and their associated costs are of less value. This
makes it important to focus on the indicators and trends in
Poland and the Soviet anion over actions taken by
participants elsewhere in the international system. While
actions by the latter actors will be important in the long-
term by displaying resolve, continuity, stability, and for
setting a western/American example, they will generally have
only a small chance of altering tha short-term decisions of
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the Soviets. With this premise in mind, pessimistic from the
American decision makers viewpoint as it is, is it possible
to determine why no intervention has yet occurred?
B. WHY NO INTERVENTION
At least one scholar must be satisfied with his
explanation of why the Soviets have failed to intervene.
While perhaps not precisely correct in matching today's
events, he nevertheless captured the essence when he wrote
that of past events,
what really determined whether the Soviets would resort
to military intervention against a domestic faction was
whether that domestic faction demonstrated to Moscow the
capacity to and will to mobilize its country for armed
resistance. 233
The Polish threat to respond to intervention with armed
force has been clear both during the recent crises and in
preceding ones. Not only has a largs group of senior Polish
army officers gone on record that it would fight an invading
army, but a Prench poll revealed that 66% of the Poles would
also resist. 23 * Finally, recent reports indicate that
Solidarity is building up defense plans and caching weapons
233 Christopher B. Jones, " Soviet Hegemony in Eastern
Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military
Intervention, " world Politics 29 (January 1977J: 217.
23 • Paris Match, 12 November 1980, cited in Christ ian
S cience~Monr^or7 1U November 19 80.
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to defend the factories. 235 They may also be joining the
militia. Soviet perceptions of the direct costs of
intervention in casualties and long-term garrison forces
must be high. The Poles have manifested their will to meet
a Soviet intervention with force clearly and in a variety of
ways. One might also wonder, however, if the Polish leaders
are not acting in a more sophisticated manner that the Czech
predecessors who also strove to avoid triggering Soviet
intervention while conducting their own reforms. Finally,
it is indeed possible that the Poles are learning to work
together. This has been a major factor, both historically
and recently, in inhibiting any lengthy peaceful interaction
in Poland. Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski has appeared capable,
during the spring, of balancing the Soviets, the Party and
Solidarity at the same time that Walesa appears to be
holding his own balancing the Party and the workers. This
ery shaky state of affairs may have been sufficient to
preclude soviet intervention thus far.
The absence of Soviet intervention may also be explained
by the unique and far-reaching natura of the problem. Since
WWII, the world has witnessed Poland experience a series of
f
23s a.S. N ews and World Report. 11 May 1981, p. 21, and
Christian Scienc e a on TTor 7 oTpril 1981.
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explosions. Each of these have contributed to gradual but
increasing differentiation of Poland from the Soviet
model. 236 Direct Soviet involvement to halt the current
process "would only intensify the Polish resentment (for)
the Russians, (and) it would precipitate another, even more
bitter, political confrontation in the future." 237 The
Polish problem today has been called a "new reality"23 *
which transcends Poland itself by portending future change
to the Bloc members both individually and collectively.
Dmitri Simes succinctly characterized the innappropriate
nature of a forceful intervention in Poland as a "desparate
solution," 239 and the Soviets have given one clear signal
that aclcnowledges their acceptance of the fact that the
Polish problem is unique. Unlike their reaction to
Czechoslovakia, to which they refused any aid in 1968, in
1980, they have given sizeable aid to the Poles, including
scarce hard currency reserves.
236 »»a aider Rubicon than in 1968," Le Monde (Paris) , 11
December 1980, in FBIS^WE, 12 December T9807"~p~7~K-2
.
237 Adam Bromke, "Poland at the Crossroads," The World Today
34 (April 1 978) : 156.
239 Jacek Hejroch, "The Polish Situation from the Viewpoint
of the Catholic Intelligentsia," speech given in Polish in
January 1981. Translated by Craig Holley.
239 Time, 1 September 1980, p. 26.
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Another explanation for the Soviet failure to react with
an intervention thus far may stem from their own nature.
Many events, with the notable exception of the 1962 Cuban
Missile crisis, support the view that they act with caution.
Jiri Valenta has argued that their decision to move on
Czechoslovakia in 1968 came in part because of their
perception of the low risks associated with this action. 240
More recent evidence has argued the tentative nature of
their initial interference in Angola in the mid-seventies.
Changing focus slightly, and avoiding the generalization of
single word characterizations, Jan P. Triska has argued that
the Soviets would generally use force only slowly for two
reasons.
1) Since 1968, the Soviets have demonstrated
sensitivity to the socio-political consequences of a
decline of welfare in Eastern Europe which can be
"avoided by prudent policies based on established,
sensible relations."
2*o jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechosl ovakia.
1968, Anatomy of a Decision ,"~TSaTfilore: The JoEns HopKlns
TOi?ertitf frets, l975f7p7 158.
16a

2) The only real military/political allies the Soviets
have are the Eastern Europeans who therefore they have a
high priority and are worthy of investment. 241
aoy aedvedev, a member of the Soviet intelligentsia, gives
corraboration to this view. He maintains that at the
conclusion of the August strikes, the CPStf adopted a long-
term strategy which counted on the slow recovery of the
preexisting institutions, 242 Further defining Soviet nature,
and showing its consistency are comments of one noted Soviet
expert made in 1967. The Soviets seek to "reserve the
always risky policy of armed force as a last
alternative." 243 Another adds that in response to complex
situations, soviet leadership "tries to keep all its options
open for as long as possible and to evade, repeatedly,
decisions on matters of principle." 244 Another aspect of
their nature is evident throughout history. They hesitate
to get involved in two places at one time. Their current
24 i Jan F f Triska, "Soviet-East European Relations," in The
foviet Union: Looking, to the 1980* s, ed. Robert Wesson
Stanford:" Hoover Tnstifution Pfess7 '980) , p. 59.
242 "Moscow Does Not Fear •Polish Contagion 1 ," La
St ampa (Turin) , 28 September 1980, p. 7. in FBI S-PSS R, ~3
October 1980, Annex.
243 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, Unity and
Conflict, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, T9"5"7j, p7
2517
2 * 4 Mario Soares, "Eurocommunism: Does It Exist?," Atlantic
Community. Quarter ly. 16(Fall 1978):276.
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occupation of Afghanistan presents them with this
dilemna. 2 * s However, the absence of intervention thus far
reflects only a decision to delay it for later
consideration. It bears great similarity to the decisions
taken in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 when
intervention occurred only after long deliberation and much
effort to solve the crises by other, more peaceful means.
The Soviet nature is closely tied to their decision
making, to which we must also turn to explain tneir lack of
intervention. Vernon Aspaturian has identified four goals
of Soviet decision makers. These are
1) Security of their territory and population.
2) preservation and enhancement of their power, prestige,
and influence.
3) preservation of the social order at home.
H) Extension of their ideological values elsewhere. 2 * 6
2*s This author does not by any means wish to convey the
impression that their occupation of Afghanistan precludes
action in Poland. The Soviets have thus far demonstrated
tolerance for the existing military balance in Afghanistan.
However, the psychological impact of their iavoivement is
more important than the military requirements this
involvement levies on them.
246 vernon Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy
in the soviet system," in Approaches to Comparative ana
International politics, ed . R. Sarry^Farrell TSvanstonT
Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 221. Asoaturian
adds t^at when in conflict with each other, security is
preeminent over ideological considerations.
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In Poland today, we have saen that all four are being
tested. They are mutually reinforcing, acting to drive the
decision in the same direction, towards intervention. But,
in light of the balance of this extended analysis, this
direction should not be surprising, it is the decision to
avoid intervention so far which we are currently seeking to
explain.
Jiri Valenta has presented us with an in-depth analysis
of the last Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. It sheds
light on our question, because of its value as a yardstick
with which we can make estimates of the status of the




3) manipulation of the rules. 247
The absence of a consensus in early December and its effect
on their actions at that time have already been noted. The
serious challenge made to the Soviets in Afghanistan may
also have strengthened the hand of the moderates in the
Politburo. Neither has an irrevocable deadline yet passed.
The Poles may have been aware of this significance of the
2»t 7a lent a, Soviet Intervention, p. 155.
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Party Congress as an action forcing element when they
postponed until July.
It is more difficult to uncover evidence of rule
changes. Valenta demonstrated that the boundaries of the
group responsible for decision maicing were altered to affect
the outcome of the decision. Since August, perhaps the most
striking event has been the retirement of Aleksei Kosygin.
But this appears to have been clearly related to his failing
health which lead to his death in December rather than to
the stand he took on Poland. The only other factor then
apparent is the reelection, without a single change, of the
entire Politburo at the 26th Party Congress held in February
of this year. This tends to indicate great caution and
concern on the parts of the most senior Sovist decision
makers.
The emphasis on the interplay of various actors within
the decision making apparatus highlighted by the
bureaucratic politics paradigm, hides another important
factor. In 1968, Leonid Brezhnev had only been in power
four years and his leadership was still shared, in the
familiar Russian troika, with Kosygin and Presidant Nicholai
Podgorny. In 198 1, Brezhnev has firm and undisputed control
of the Politburo. The Soviet leadership is also marked by
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greater homogeneity today arising from his appointment,
through the years, of many subordinates who ace loyal to
hia. It is also apparent that his health has improved in
the last two years. This gives him greater strength with
which to exert his influence within that body. These new
realities in the Soviet Politburo may help explain their
reticence to move on Poland. However, the events of early
December indicate that *e cannot rely on these or on the
tested and failing policy related by Roy Medvedev, to
preclude a future decision to intervene.
One final reason is less important but highly
illuminating. The lack of Soviet intervention ^thus far may
revolve about the severe difficulties which the Soviets
experienced during their mobilization in August during the
strikes. One report noted extraordinary confusion and
discipline problems. 248 A second one was more definitive,
noting that the party First Secretary in the Transcarpathian
military district lost his job because of the discipline
problems which included mass desertions of assembly points
and which led to dragooning on tha streets of the district.
"Severe demoralization" and "sympathy" for the Poles may
2** Washington Post, 13 February 1981
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have stemmed from the reservists 1 Polish and Czech ethnic
backgrounds. 249
This one report reveals indisputable proof of the
sensitivity of both the western regions to the events
occurring in Poland and of the Politburo to its own western
problems. In 1968, the same First Secretary of the
Transcarpathian Regional Committee/ Yuri Ii^itski was used
by the Politburo to dramatize the situation in his
region. 2S0 In a largely unprecedented manuever, he was
invited to speak in the Politburo. let in 1980,. it appears
that his zealousness in ordering dragooning and the
commandeering of automobiles was viewed as potentially
destabilizing in the precarious environment. Rather than
being called to the Politburo to urge the intervention he
obviously wanted, he was removed. Again the thread of Soviet
caution and concern emerges.
The Polish threat to respond, the unique nature of the
problem, the nature of the Soviets, and their decision
making apparatus have combined to thus far limit Soviet
initiatives in Poland. However, they can all be overcome by
a serious turn of events in Poland. What other responses
*• The Financial Times (London) , 13 February 1931
2 so Valenta, Soviet Interve ntion, p. 60.
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could the Soviets make to answar increasing tensions in
Poland?
C. ALTERNATIVES TO INTERVENTION
Five alternatives present themselves as possible means
to alleviate the need to resort to the forceful use of the
Soviet military. The first is to accept the status quo. The
Soviets have not yet adopted this approach in its entirety.
Their statements and press releases, accompanied by the
vitriolic East German and Czech attacks which the Soviets
allow, give evidence to their continuing pressure. However,
allowing this distinction, soviet acceptance of the status
gjio, of polish renewal within the international communist
subsystem, would be a surprise. Although most observers
feel that eventual Soviet intervention is almost a
certainty, it has been noted that in previous crises
situations the Soviets have always surprised the West.
Arguments for and against their acceptance of the status g;uo
have been made throughout this analysis.
The second and third alternatives have already been
exercised. The second. one is administrative intervention.
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This occurred in late November and early December of last
year. 2S1 Its importance as an alternative is very limited.
It has two principle roles. In the first, of information
collection, it has presumably met with success. In its
second, to freeze Polish forces in the event of
intervention, no evaluation can be definitive, but it should
be regarded as less likely to succeed in view of past
experience and Polish determination. The third alternative
to intervention is to use manuevers to strengthen the Party
and to intimidate the masses. Jiri Pelikan quotes Vasil
Bilak, a Czechoslovak Presidium member, as observing that in
1968, the manuevers were an "important form of Soviet
assistance to the Czechoslovak Communist Party in mobilizing
itself and expelling the revisionists.
"
25a This alternative
must be viewed as a failure after the March strikes which
occurred in the midst of Soviet manuevers.
A fourth alternative appears to have only the remotest
of possibilities. This would be for independent action on
the part of Poland's East European neighbors. It seems
unlikely because of the small East German armsd forces and
251 CBS. "Evening News," 9 December 1980, and Washington
Star, 18 December 1930.
252 "Moscow Working for a Break," Avanti {Rome) , 29-30 March
1981, pp. 1,20, in FSHzSEa, 8 ApriT"TSr8t, p. G-10.
172

the extreme Polish sensitivity to them, and the lack of a
Czech military tradition.
The last alternative is perhaps more serious than that
of soviet intervention because of its unknown qualities.
This alternative would see a civil war break out in Poland.
This alternative draws its potential from the state of
Poland as revealed in the first chapter and must continue to
cause concern. It could be induced by external pressure on
the Polish leaders to renege on their agreements with the
Polish citizenry. It. could also arise from the replacement
of the present moderate PUWP leaders with some of the
Party* s more hardline members. Because its unpredictable
nature would unquestionably threaten the Soviet perceptions
of their own security, this eventuality would doubtlessly
lead directly to Soviet intervention. 253 However, possible
alternatives are not necessarily probable ones. It seems
unlikely that the Soviets would deliberately set the stage
for a civil war. This is far from a cautious approach.
International military intervention into a civil war
involves too many variables. While it would serve to lower
the costs and increase the perceived legitimacy of the
253 "Two Contradictions of the Polish Crisis,"
AvantifTur in) , 14-15 December 1980, Culture Supplement, p.




action, the unguantifiably increased difficulties incumbent
in the option would more than offset the benefits gained.
This leads to the conclusion that the Soviets have two
practical alternatives. First, to maintain v their present
course, incorrectly identified as a status c[uo, and two, to
order a military intervention. What developments could be
expected to trigger an intervention?
D. WHEN INTERVENTION COMES
Andrzej Korbonski writes "it is virtually impossible to
identify a situation that can trigger Soviet armed
intervention because it is capable of changing the rules at
any tine. 11 *** Notwithstanding this gloomy prognosis, we must
endeavor to determine which situations may trigger Soviet:
intervention into Poland within the next year. Many previous
triggers have been pulled by the events occurring since last
august, but none have yet fired a round. This has rendered
a situation in which increasingly higher peaks of tension
and increasingly stronger challenges have been backed away
from almost without exception. This forces the analyst to
25* Andrzej Korbonski. "Eastern Europe and the Soviet




work on shaky ground far outside the constraints he has
worked within until recently.
The search for a trigger must lead first to the most
significant event which has not yet had to have been
accepted, the total breakdown of the party*s control. This
has already been identified as the single fundamental change
to occur in Poland since August. Party dissension is
continuing to grow and is attracting greater degrees of
Soviet attention as the days pass.
The free election of delegates, addressed in Chapter I,
is pointing the way towards a general turnover of the cadres
which is awesome. There is every possibility that a new
Central Committee can be elected which will in turn elect a
new Politburo. Finally, Stanislaw Kania stands a
surprisingly serious chance of baing replaced. This is
dramatic but also dangerous for the new leaders who could
replace them are not established and will have little
experience running the country or dealing with their Soviet
and East European neighbors. This peaceful revolution might
not, by itself, be unpalatable to the Soviets, but any
effort by the current Polish elites to maintain their
positions in the face of this wellspring could be the spark
in the powder keg. It is inconceivable that intervention
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would not be ordered if they should they decide that the
party had lost control or that the country was out of
control.
The other situation which could foreshadow a Soviet
intervention would be a Soviet perception that failure to
act would seriously weaken Soviet authority within the
region. This perception would bear a direct correlation
with the probability of a spillover of the Polish contagion
into neighboring countries. But is is not clear that the
Soviets would move in Poland to preclude a spillover
elsewhere. They might find it advantageous to allow the
spillover to occur. They could then follow their own 1956
precedent when intervention in Poland was deferred by a
sudden crisis which arose in Hungary. As in the earlier
case, this would send an unambiguous signal to the Poles
while also reducing many of the unavoidable costs which a
Polish intervention would entail. 2SS
Thus far, both Czechoslovakia and the GDR have remained
largely insulated from the Polish events, reducing, so far,
2ss These incumbent costs include the resistance expected
from the large militant population, large territory
requiring control, and the central location which
ieopardizes the lines of communication to the GDR. More
importantly, a move into another country would allow them to
overcome the mistake of the deferred action for which they
would have to pay in Poland. See James Cable, Gunboat
Dijalomacv./ (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) , p. 1F27"
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this possibility. But this insulation has very little
durability. The East Germans have accomplished this by
redirecting attention with sharp attacks of West Germany.
Hungary continues in a skeptical view and only Yugoslavia
still makes comments in its media that renewal of the POWP
is possible. The reality of the problem of remaining
isolated form the contagion of freedom is amply evidenced by
a recent Romanian defector who told of widespread "awareness
and admiration" in her country of the Polish experiment. 2S6
It should be expected that the East Europeans will continue
to generally assault the events in Poland and counsel the
Soviets for the intervention which the latter are so
hesitant to make.
Should the Soviets decide to intervene, their decision
would be taken only a few days prior to the operation. Their
action would be characterized by three conditions. First, it
is clear that they would attempt to pre-deploy as many
forces as possible throughout Poland, as they may have been
attempting in December when they requested to transit four
divisions of troops through Poland to East Germany. Airborne
and air mobile forces would also play a major role in the
initial stages. Second, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in
2S6 chr ist ian Science Monitor, 8 April 1981.
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Afghanistan in 1979, as well as in Manchuria and Berlin in
1945, large numbers of forces would be available. This cost
is high, but mass is a principle well-founded in their
history and is a key element in their military doctrine.
Finally, the move would be attended by a clever deception
plan. This is also key to their doctrine.
Neither should the Soviet capability to achieve their
objective of quelling the Polish revolution in the short-run
be doubted. Seweryn Bialer has offered a very real scenario
in which the Soviets withhold food from striking Poles and
their families. 2S7 While a Western thinker might wish to
feel that this was a totally alien plan, we must remember
that the situation which brought it about, Soviet domination
of an extranational population, is also alien to our
acknowledged thought processes.
In light of these statements, what sort of actions can
the West in general and the OS in particular, take to
militate against soviet intervention? This author maintains
that the decision to prepare, accurately and in a most
detailed fashion reported by Representative Les Aspin's
257 Christ ian Science Monitor, 8 April 1981
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subcommittee in January 1 981 is very different from the
decision to intervene. 2S8 While the first may levy a
constraint on the minimum time required for a prepared
Soviet reaction, it should not be confused with the very
short-term decision to intervene. Both the events in the
Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 and those detailed in the
December 1980 periods give credence to this observation.
If the decision to act is taken only in the short-term,
then effective Western response must become .operational in
the same time frame. Short of significant military action
perceived to be capable of successful completion in the same
time period, few alternatives are available. There is some
evidence that western intelligence was transmitted to the
Poles during early December, thus further limiting the
Soviet ability to gain surprise. This may have been and can
be effective in the future. Other options should be
developed within the constraints of high cost to the
Soviets, of requiring a short-term to operational! ze , and of
directly challenging the decision we seek to influence. Use
of these options should also occur prior to the event they
seek to preclude. Only within these constraints can we hope
258 new York Times, 2 January 1981. Report of the House




to be successful. If we do not develop options matching
these constraints, then we will confirm the pessimistic
analyses of many scholars whose observations are reflected
in the words of Robert W. Tucker. "There are no counter-





The Soviets have many powerful long-term arguments for
intervention. Thus far, they have perceived that the short-
term arguments to refrain from direct military intervention
have been more powerful. The ability of the Poles to
successfully bring about the changes which the vast majority
of the population supports has been amply revealed by Soviet
acquiescence, thus far, of radical change. Acceptance of
the reality of solidarity appears to be genuine. The Soviets
have also acknowledged both the similarities of the Polish
economic problem in other East European countries and that
some renewal of leaders is necessary because mistakes on
their part contributed to the problem at hand. But the
progress of events in Poland gives every indication that it
is only a matter of time before the Poles issue a challenge
2S9 Robert W. Tucker, "Trading Poland for the Gulf,"
Harpers, April 1981, p. 18.
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that Soviets will not be able to overlook. If intervention
occurs, it will be because the Poles failed to properly
conduct their guest. But this qusst is terribly difficult.
No less a philosopher than Montesquieu has noted that
political authority in the state begins to be eroded from
the moment its principles of legitimacy begin to be
questioned. The history of this crisis has revealed an
eight to ten week cycle of quiet and tension. Ths last ended
in early April. As this is written, the next period is
almost upon us, and the deadline of the Party Congress
approaches. Thus, we too, should heed the words of Jozef
Lenart, a member of the Czech Central Committee Presidium.
"It is of supreme importance to remain vigilant ,,2 *° to the
continuing and growing threat to Poland today.
2*o <»»orlcing Class Vanguard," Pravda (Moscow) , 20 February
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